| 研究生: |
洪立文 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
存在負面品牌效果下的共同廣告問題研究 Research of advertising cooperation under retail promotion with negative brand image |
| 指導教授: | 林柏生 |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年: | 2010 |
| 畢業學年度: | 98 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 42 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | feedback 策略 、合作廣告 、行銷通路 、負面品牌效果 、零售商自有品牌 |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:95 下載:0 |
| 分享至: |
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本文使用微分賽局模型對單一製造商與零售商之間的廣告合作關係進行探討。製造商在全國進行廣告以建立產品商譽,而零售商則在當地進行促銷以增加產品銷售量;但促銷行動會損害該產品的商譽,且零售商除了販售製造商的national brand之外還販售自己引進的private brand。此外本文試圖探討零售商對於national brand商譽累積的不同態度(短視近利與有遠見的)對雙方利潤所造成的影響。結果顯示,若商譽的存量小於某一水準時,零售商的最適策略是表現出短視近利的態度。且零售商引進private brand一定會對製造商的利潤造成負面的影響,但廣告合作計畫可改善此狀況。最後,對於零售商來說,只有在期初的商譽小於某一水準時,引進private brand才可能獲利。
第一章 導論 1
第二章 模型設定 4
第一節 廣告模型設定 4
第二節 SFNE與SFSE策略的比較 9
第三章 均衡求解 12
第一節 通路合作 12
第二節 廠商之間無廣告合作計畫 14
第三節 廠商之間存在廣告合作計畫 20
第四章 均衡策略之結果比較 25
第一節 均衡促銷策略比較 25
第二節 零售商與製造商之利潤水準比較 27
第五章 結論與建議 34
參考文獻 36
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