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| 研究生： |
陳畊嘉 Chen, Keng Chia |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
論科諾寡占中之垂直整併促成:以互補要素模型分析 Vertical Merger Facilitation in Cournot Oligopolies with Complementary Inputs |
| 指導教授： |
溫偉任
Wen, Wei Jen |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2014 |
| 畢業學年度： | 102 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 50 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 垂直整併 、產業結構 、賽局理論 、科諾寡占 、雙互補要素 、補貼 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | Vertical Integration, Industry Structure, Game Theory, Cournot Oligopolies, Complementary Inputs, Subsidy |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：105 下載：37 |
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本文利用互補要素模型分析科諾寡占市場之垂直整併誘因，並討論模型中存在的各種均衡市場結構。當上游的中間財一由獨占廠商生產，另一由寡占廠商生產時，獨占的中間財生產者的利潤會隨著垂直整併廠商家數增加而增加。其原因在於垂直整併廠商消除了雙重加價而降低生產成本，從而增加均衡產量並衍生對獨占的中間財之需求。由於獨占中間財廠商可以從其他廠商的垂直整併獲利，它甚至有誘因貼補其他廠商以促成垂直整併，使得產業均衡結構變成完全整併。本文亦支持垂直整併會促進效率的論點，並當有獨占勞工工會存在時，廠商進行產業垂直整併後會使得勞工工資上漲。因此本文結果可對反托拉斯法的垂直整併管制提供多元政策意涵，並對多要素投入的垂直相關市場有更全面的市場結構預測。
The equilibrium industry structure is investigated in this research by using a complementary input model highlighting the vertical integration incentives in a Cournot successive oligopolistic market. The upstream input markets composed of a monopolist and N oligopolists would exhibit the increasing monopolistic rent as more vertically-integrated firms emerge in the market. This equilibrium is sustained by the production boosting outcome resulting from the circumvention of the double marginalization problem for the vertically-integrated producers which in turn drives up the derived demand toward the solely supplied upstream input. The more vertically-integrated firms in a market, the more profits a monopolist gains. There is an incentive for it to subsidise vertical integration. The result here also supports the efficiency-improving and the wage-increasing result stemming from the larger output and lower price in the final goods market after the vertical integration. This paper would shed some light on the antitrust regulation over the vertical integration in vertically-related markets composed of multiple complementary inputs.
1 緒論 1
2 文獻回顧與探討 4
3 理論基礎 7
3.1 基準模型設定 7
3.1.1 模型參數定義 9
3.1.2 賽局決策順序 10
3.2 基準模型均衡分析 11
3.2.1 下游市場競爭階段 11
3.2.2 上游市場競爭階段(X 要素市場) 12
3.2.3 上游市場競爭階段(Y 要素市場) 13
3.3 基準模型研究結果 17
3.3.1 「完全整併」為唯一均衡解之產業結構 17
3.3.2 同時存在「完全整併」或「完全分立」兩種均衡解之產業結構 21
3.3.3 各內生參數與廠商總家數及整併廠商組數之關係 29
4 加入新賽局階段的延伸模型 31
4.1 延伸模型設定 31
4.1.1 賽局決策順序 31
4.2 延伸模型研究結果 33
4.2.1 獨占廠商進行補貼之意願與可行性 33
4.2.2 與Gaudet and Long (1996) 之模型比較 35
4.2.3 非獨占廠商進行補貼之可能性 37
5 結論、建議與未來研究展望 38
A 附錄 42
A.1 輔理一證明 42
A.2 輔理二證明 42
A.3 輔理三證明 43
A.4 定理三證明 47
B 英文參考文獻 48
C 中文參考文獻 50
圖目錄
1 N家上游B廠商及下游D廠商，其中有K組整併為M廠商 8
2 賽局決策順序(一) 10
3 賽局決策順序(二) 32
4 均衡比較表 39
表目錄
1 文獻摘要比較表 6
2 模型參數定義 9
3 當上下游廠商家數各兩家(N = 2) 時之各參數值 17
4 當上下游廠商家數各兩家(N = 2) 時之整併賽局 17
5 當上下游廠商家數各三家(N = 3) 時之各參數值 18
6 當上下游廠商家數各四家(N = 4) 時之各參數值 21
7 不同廠商家數N 下所對應的反轉點 22
8 在不同廠商家數N下，成為第一家整併廠商之上下游部門利潤變化量 25
9 廠商家數為N及無窮時，產業結構為完全分立及完全整併下之均衡解 26
10 各內生參數與廠商總家數N及整併廠商組數K之關係 29
11 當上下游廠商家數各四家(N = 4)時之利潤 33
12 兩模型在上下游廠商家數各四家(N = 4) 時之利潤比較 35
13 兩模型在上下游廠商家數各五家(N = 5) 時之利潤比較 36
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