俄烏戰爭爆發後，西方國家對俄羅斯實施大規模金融制裁，包括將部分俄羅斯銀行排除於國際支付網路之外、凍結外匯儲備、強化美元清算限制，以及擴大對金融機構與關聯企業之制裁範圍。在此背景下，加密貨幣逐漸成為觀察俄羅斯如何回應金融制裁的重要切入點。本研究探討俄羅斯如何在金融制裁壓力下，逐步形成影子加密金融體系，並分析其形成條件、運作機制、成效與限制，以及其在國際政治經濟理論上的意涵。
本研究採質性研究，結合文獻分析法與案例研究法，從俄羅斯影子經濟的歷史土壤、金融制裁與支付武器化、加密貨幣的工具化，以及制度化與再中心化等層面建構分析架構，並選取 A7A5 盧布穩定幣、Garantex與Grinex交易所，以及 Rosbank加密支付試點作為代表性案例，以觀察工具層、節點層與制度層如何交互作用。相關資料包括英文與俄文文獻、俄羅斯官方法規與政策文件、美國與歐盟制裁公告、鏈上分析報告，以及相關新聞與智庫報告，將個案分析回扣至科技民族主義、武器化相互依存與戰略性逃逸等理論視角，以檢視俄羅斯案例在制裁政治、金融權力與數位技術治理上的理論意義。
研究發現顯示，俄羅斯影子加密金融體系並非單純由 2022 年後的制裁所催生，而是建立在長期影子經濟傳統、非正式治理邏輯與制度模糊性之上；金融制裁與支付武器化則進一步促使加密貨幣由投機性資產轉化為備援支付與跨境結算工具。A7A5、Garantex與Grinex、Rosbank 等案例顯示，俄羅斯確實透過穩定幣、交易節點與制度試點，在特定場景中維持支付鏈不中斷、支撐部分戰略性進口，並提升整體經濟體系的韌性。然而，這種替代安排仍面臨流動性瓶頸、價格波動、鏈上可追蹤性，以及國際監管聯盟持續升級的封堵壓力。本研究認為，俄羅斯的加密實踐不應被理解為對全球金融體系的全面替代，而應被視為一種具有高度摩擦、有限制度化與持續重組特徵的「戰略性逃逸」實踐。

Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Western countries imposed large-scale financial sanctions on Russia, including excluding certain Russian banks from international payment networks, freezing foreign exchange reserves, tightening restrictions on U.S. dollar clearing, and expanding sanctions against financial institutions and affiliated enterprises. Against this backdrop, cryptocurrency has gradually become an important entry point for examining how Russia responds to financial sanctions. This study explores how Russia, under the pressure of financial sanctions, has gradually developed a shadow crypto-financial system, and analyzes its conditions of formation, operational mechanisms, effectiveness, and limitations, as well as its implications for theories of international political economy.
This study adopts a qualitative research approach, combining literature analysis and case study methods. It constructs an analytical framework from the historical foundations of Russia’s shadow economy, financial sanctions and the weaponization of payments, the instrumentalization of cryptocurrency, and the processes of institutionalization and re-centralization. It further selects the A7A5 ruble-backed stablecoin, the Garantex and Grinex exchanges, and Rosbank’s crypto payment pilot as representative cases in order to examine how the tool layer, node layer, and institutional layer interact with one another. The research materials include English- and Russian-language literature, official Russian laws and policy documents, U.S. and EU sanctions announcements, blockchain analytics reports, as well as relevant news and think tank reports. The case analysis is then situated within the theoretical perspectives of techno-nationalism, weaponized interdependence, and strategic escape, so as to assess the theoretical significance of the Russian case in relation to sanction politics, financial power, and digital technology governance.
The findings show that Russia’s shadow crypto-financial system was not simply generated by the sanctions imposed after 2022; rather, it is rooted in the long-term traditions of the shadow economy, informal governance logic, and institutional ambiguity. Financial sanctions and the weaponization of payments further accelerated the transformation of cryptocurrency from a speculative asset into a backup payment and cross-border settlement tool. Cases such as A7A5, Garantex and Grinex, and Rosbank demonstrate that Russia has indeed relied on stablecoins, exchange nodes, and institutional pilot schemes to maintain the continuity of payment chains in specific settings, support strategic imports, and enhance the resilience of the overall economic system. However, such alternative arrangements still face liquidity bottlenecks, price volatility, the traceability of on-chain transactions, and the growing pressure of blockade and compliance from international regulatory coalitions. This study argues that Russia’s crypto practices should not be understood as a full substitute for the global financial system, but rather as a form of “strategic escape” characterized by high friction, limited institutionalization, and continuous reconfiguration.

Ahari, A., Brosens, T., de Vries, R., & van den Broek, D. (2023). Is it easy to hide money in the crypto economy? The case of sanctioned actors (SUERF Policy Brief No. 501). SUERF.
Ahari, A., Duong, J., Hanzl, J., Lichtenegger, E. M., Lobnik, L., & Timel, A. (2022). Is it easy to hide money in the crypto economy? The case of Russia. Focus on European Economic Integration, 2022(4), 71–89.
Aksenova, M. A. (2022). Legal support for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regimes in the context of integrating new technologies. RUDN Journal of Law, 26(1), 112-128.
Almeida, J., & Gonçalves, T. C. (2025). Cryptocurrencies and economic sanctions. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 63, 101974.
Andreas, P. (2005). Criminalizing the consequences of sanctions: Embargo busting and its legacy. International Studies Quarterly, 49(2), 335–360. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2005.00347.x
Atkinson, R. D. (2005). The past and future of industrial policy. Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.
Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Cornell University Press.
Bank for International Settlements. (2022). III. The future monetary system. In Annual Economic Report 2022, 63-90. https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2022e3.htm
Bank of Russia (2025). New experimental legal regime for cryptocurrency transactions. https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=23454
Bank of Russia (2025). Digital ruble rollout. https://cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=25774
Barsukova, S. Y., & Ledeneva, A. V. (2012). Informal economy in Russia: A brief overview. Economic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter, 13(2), 4–12.
Breznitz, D. (2021). Innovation in real places: Strategies for prosperity in an unforgiving world. Oxford University Press.
Bureau of Industry and Security. (2022). Commerce implements severe restrictions on exports to Russia in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine [Press release]. U.S. Department of Commerce.
Chainalysis Team. (2025). Treasury sanctions cryptocurrency exchange and network enabling sanctions evasion and cyber criminals. Chainalysis. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/russian-exchange-garantex-dismantled/
Chainalysis. (2022–2024). Crypto and global sanctions [Research reports]. Chainalysis.
Chainalysis. (2025a). August 2025: Charts in review. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/charts-in-review-august-2025/
Chainalysis. (2025b). Legislated sanctions evasion: How the Garantex rebrand, Grinex, and the ruble-backed token, A7A5, have shaped Russia’s shadow crypto economy. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/a7a5-grinex-russian-crypto-economy-ofac-sanctions-august-2025/
Chainalysis. (2026). Crypto crime in 2025 was primarily driven by a 694% surge in state-driven sanctions evasion volume. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-sanctions-2026/
Connolly, R. (2018). Russia’s response to sanctions: How Western economic statecraft is reshaping political economy in Russia. Cambridge University Press.
Connolly, R. (2022). The Russian economy: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Connolly, R., & Hanson, P. (2022). Russia and the West: Sanctions and the future of economic statecraft. Journal of Strategic Studies, 45(2), 183–210.
Consultative Group of Directors of Financial Stability. (2023). Financial stability risks from cryptoassets in emerging market economies (BIS Papers No. 138). Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap138.htm
Council of the EU. (2022, February 24). European Council conclusions on Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine (Conclusions 163/22).
Council of the EU. (2022, February 25). Extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council: Main results.
Council of the European Union. (2025). 19th package of sanctions against Russia: EU targets Russian energy, third-country banks and crypto providers. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/
Council of the European Union. (2025, October 23). 19th package of sanctions against Russia: EU targets Russian energy, third-country banks and crypto providers.
De Soto, H. (1989). The other path: The invisible revolution in the Third World. Harper & Row.
Drezner, D. W. (1999). The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge University Press.
Drezner, D. W. (2009). The power and peril of international regime complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 65–70.
Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice. International Studies Review, 13(1), 96–108.
Drezner, D. W. (2015). Targeted sanctions in a world of global finance. International Interactions, 41(4), 755–764.
Dyson, B., Mann, A., & Tanner, J. (2022). Financial weaponization and the future of digital sovereignty. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
Elliptic (2026). A7A5: The ruble-backed stablecoin crosses $100 billion in transactions. https://www.elliptic.co/blog/a7a5-the-ruble-backed-stablecoin-crosses-100-billion-in-transactions
European Commission. (2025, October 23). EU adopts new sanctions against Russia.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
Federal Register. (2025). Notice of OFAC sanctions action. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/18/2025-15668/notice-of-ofac-sanctions-action
Ferranti, M. (2024). Hedging sanctions risk: Cryptocurrency in central bank strategy [Working paper]. SSRN.
Financial Action Task Force (2022). Updated guidance for a risk-based approach to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers.
Financial Action Task Force (2021). Updated guidance for a risk-based approach to virtual assets and virtual asset service providers. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Updated-Guidance-Rba-Virtual-Assets-Vasps.html
Gilpin, R. (1982). War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press.
Gimpelson, V., & Kapeliushnikov, R. (2014). Informality in the Russian labour market: Causes and consequences. IZA Discussion Paper, 8279.
Grossman, G. (1977). The “second economy” of the USSR. Problems of Communism, 26(5), 25–40.
Hirschman, A. O. (1977). The passions and the interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph. Princeton University Press.
Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic sanctions reconsidered (3rd ed.). Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Internet Crime Complaint Center. (2025, February 26). FBI warns of North Korean cyber actors responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack (PSA 250226).
Ivantsov, S. V., Sidenko, E. L., Spasennikov, B. A., Beriozkin, Y. M., & Sukhodolov, Y. A. (2019). Crimes related to the use of cryptocurrency: Main criminological trends. All-Russian Criminological Journal, 13(1), 85-93.
Kamps, A., & Kleinberg, J. (2024). Assessing the impact of sanctions in the crypto ecosystem [Preprint]. arXiv.
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Little, Brown.
Kirshner, J. (1995). Currency and coercion: The political economy of international monetary power. Princeton University Press.
Korhonen, I., & Seabra, F. (2023). Cryptocurrency flows and sanctions evasion: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine war. Journal of International Money and Finance, 138(102868).
Kremlin (2024). Regulatory sandbox for digital currency. https://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/74778
Kremlin (2024). Mining regulation law. https://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/74777
Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia’s economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange. Cambridge University Press.
Ledeneva, A. V. (2009). From Russia with blat: Can informal networks help modernize Russia? Social Research, 76(1), 257–288.
Ledeneva, A. V. (2013). Can Russia modernise? Sistema, power networks and informal governance. Cambridge University Press.
Loxton, J. (2020). The Petro’s failure: Venezuela’s ill-fated foray into cryptocurrency. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 156–170.
Meyer, T. (2021). The digital republic: How to govern the tech world. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Montesquieu. (1989). The spirit of the laws (A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, & H. S. Stone, Eds. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1748)
Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. (2025, October 22). The DPRK’s violation and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and information technology worker activities. https://msmt.info/Publications/Reports
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
Norrlof, C. (2010). America’s global advantage: US hegemony after the crash. Cambridge University Press.
Office of Foreign Assets Control. (2025). Notice of OFAC sanctions actions. Federal Register. https://www.federalregister.gov/
Ostry, S., & Nelson, R. R. (1995). Techno-nationalism and techno-globalism: Conflict and cooperation. Brookings Institution Press.
Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security, 22(2), 90–136. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.90
Radaev, V. (2020). The Russian shadow economy in the age of digitalization. Russian Journal of Economics, 6(4), 363–385.
Reuters (2024a). Russia is using cryptocurrencies in foreign trade, finance minister says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/russia-is-using-bitcoin-foreign-trade-finance-minister-says-2024-12-25/
Reuters. (2024b). US targets Russian fintech operators for Ukraine sanctions evasion work. https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-targets-russian-fintech-operators-ukraine-sanctions-evasion-work-2024-03-25/
Reuters (2025a). Report on sanctioned exchanges evading restrictions through new entities. Reuters.
Reuters (2025b). Russian Garantex cryptocurrency exchange targeted in international operation, US says. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-garantex-cryptocurrency-exchange-targeted-international-operation-us-2025-03-07/
Robinson, T. (2021, May 21). How Iran uses Bitcoin mining to evade sanctions and “export” millions of barrels of oil. Foreign Policy.
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2024). Euro SIFMANet: Virtual asset sanctions roundtable report. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/conference-reports/euro-sifmanet-virtual-asset-sanctions-roundtable-report
RUSI. (2024). Euro SIFMANet: European sanctions and illicit finance monitoring and analysis network: Virtual asset sanctions roundtable report. https://static.rusi.org/digital-assets-sanctions-report-SIFMANET-web-final.pdf
Russian Federation. (2020). Federal Law No. 259-FZ of July 31, 2020: On digital financial assets, digital currency and on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation. Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, No. 31, Art. 5018.
Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2000). Shadow economies: Size, causes, and consequences. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 77–114.
Scott, B. (2022). The crypto war: Digital assets and the sanctioning of Russia. New Political Economy, 27(6), 1061–1075.
Segal, A. (2016). The hacked world order. PublicAffairs.
Sokolov, D., & Naumenko, I. (2024). Digital blat: Cryptocurrency and the shadow governance of sanctions evasion in Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, 40(1), 1–20.
Strange, S. (1988). States and markets. Pinter Publishers.
TASS. (2024, July 30). Law legalizing mining in Russia comes into effect. TASS Russian News Agency.
TRM Labs. (2025, July 21). Russia leveraging Kyrgyzstan’s crypto ecosystem to evade sanctions. https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/russia-leveraging-kyrgyzstans-crypto-ecosystem-to-evade-sanctions
TRM Labs. (2026a). 2026 crypto crime report: Illicit crypto trends and typologies. https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2026-crypto-crime-report
TRM Labs. (2026b, January 10). 2026 crypto crime report key insights: TRM identifies record USD 158 billion in illicit crypto flows in 2025, reversing a multi-year decline. https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/2026-crypto-crime-report-key-insights-trm-identifies-record-usd-158-billion-in-illicit-crypto-flows-in-2025-reversing-a-multi-year-decline
U.S. Department of Justice. (2025). Garantex cryptocurrency exchange disrupted in international operation. https://www.justice.gov/
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2022–2024). Sanctions related to Garantex LLC [OFAC designation notices].
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2022a, April 5). Treasury sanctions Russian virtual currency exchange Garantex. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0701
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2022b, August 8). Treasury sanctions notorious virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2024, March 25). Treasury designates Russian companies supporting sanctions evasion through virtual asset services and technology procurement. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2204
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025, August 14). Treasury sanctions cryptocurrency exchange and network enabling sanctions evasion and cyber criminals. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0225
Volkov, V. (2002). Violent entrepreneurs: The use of force in the making of Russian capitalism. Cornell University Press.
Volkov, V. V. (1999). Violent entrepreneurship in post-communist Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(5), 741–754.
Wegge, J. (2022). Pre-adaptation and resilience: Russia’s financial defenses before the 2022 sanctions. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 63(6), 679–705.
Zhao, J., & Miao, J. (2023). Is Bitcoin used to evade financial sanction? Finance Research Letters, 55(Part B), 104005. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104005
Zwitter, A., Gstrein, O. J., & Matskoulidze, E. J. (2023). The proliferation of cybersecurity sovereignty: The case of blockchain and sanctions evasion. International Affairs, 99(2), 687–707.
二、俄文文獻
Forklog. (2023, June 2). Росбанк запустил пилотные трансграничные криптоплатежи. https://forklog.com/news/rosbank-zapustil-pilotnye-transgranichnye-platezhi-v-kriptovalyute
Gizatulin, R. R. (2025). Правовое регулирование криптовалют: сравнительный анализ и проблемы правового статуса [Legal regulation of cryptocurrencies: Comparative analysis and issues of legal status]. Экономические науки, 5, 45–52. Interfax. (2025, April 23). Минфин и ЦБ РФ запустят криптобиржу для суперквалифицированных инвесторов. https://www.interfax.ru/business/1022352
Isaev, A. V. (2024). Операционные проблемы регулирования оборота криптовалют: налоговые и правовые аспекты [Operational regulatory issues of cryptocurrency circulation: Taxation and legal aspects]. Финансовое право, 7, 38–44.
Kontur.Normativ. (2024, March 11). Федеральный закон от 11.03.2024 N 45-ФЗ.
Kuznetsov, M. (2023, June 2). Росбанк первым среди крупных банков запустит трансграничные платежи в криптовалюте. Vedomosti. https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2023/06/02/978259-rosbank-pervim-zapustit-transgranichnie-platezhi-v-kriptovalyute
Orlova, N. L., & Semenov, V. V. (2025). Цифровые финансовые активы и их интеграция в международные расчёты [Digital financial assets and their integration into international settlements]. Экономические науки, 3, 59–68.
RBC Crypto. (2023, June 2). Российские компании получили возможность оплачивать импорт криптовалютой через Росбанк. https://www.rbc.ru/crypto/news/64798fc79a79470249aee3c0
RBC Crypto. (2024, April 24). «Нет самого интересного». Что изменит закон о криптовалюте для ВЭД. https://www.rbc.ru/crypto/news/66293ac09a79474a6f79a133
RBC. (2023, June 2). Российские компании получили возможность оплачивать импорт криптовалютой через Росбанк.
Ryabukhin, S. N., Minchenkov, M. A., Kokorev, I. A., & Kireeva, N. V. (2024). Цифровые финансовые активы как инструмент международных расчётов [Digital financial assets as an instrument of international settlements]. Мир новой экономики, 18(2), 59–68.
Sagarev, A. A., & Semenova, T. V. (2024). Регулирование криптовалют в Российской Федерации: проблемы и перспективы [Cryptocurrency regulation in the Russian Federation: Problems and prospects]. Финансовое право, 9, 21–27.
Vedomosti. (2023, June 2). Росбанк первым среди крупных банков запустит трансграничные платежи в криптовалюте.