本研究以比較政治經濟學的角度，探討美中兩國在稀土資源治理中的「武器化」邏輯與制度。稀土是支撐新能源、高科技與國防工業的重要關鍵礦產，亦是近年大國競逐的焦點。既有研究多從供應鏈脆弱性與地緣政治衝突解釋稀土風險，但較少系統性處理：在「國家安全／經濟安全」框架下，稀土如何被政策行動者安全化並進一步武器化，以及不同制度條件下的政策工具使用是否呈現趨同。

本研究以比較政治經濟與安全化視角為主線，分析中國與美國在稀土政策中如何動員出口管制、投資審查、補貼與供應鏈重組等工具，並提出「趨同/不趨同」的判準。另以台灣作為延伸觀察點，討論在材料依賴與供應鏈安全化雙重壓力下的結構性風險與策略空間。

From the perspective of comparative political economy (CPE), this study examines the logic and institutions of "weaponization" within the governance of rare earth resources by the United States and China. Rare earths are critical minerals vital to supporting new energy, high-tech, and defense industries, making them a focal point of recent great power competition. While existing literature predominantly explains rare earth risks through the lenses of supply chain vulnerability and geopolitical conflict, it rarely offers a systematic analysis of how policy actors securitize and subsequently weaponize rare earths within a "national security/economic security" framework, or whether the deployment of policy tools under distinct institutional conditions exhibits convergence.

Adopting comparative political economy and securitization perspectives as its analytical core, this thesis analyzes how China and the United States mobilize policy tools—such as export controls, investment screening, subsidies, and supply chain restructuring—in their respective rare earth policies, while establishing criteria to evaluate "convergence versus divergence." Furthermore, using Taiwan as an extended case study, this research discusses the structural risks and strategic maneuvering room available under the dual pressures of material dependence and supply chain securitization.

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