摘 要
本文係以Obstfeld (1996) 所發展的第二代匯率制度模型為基礎，探討央行官員在不同薪資設計之下，提高他們的薪資懲罰，對匯率制度變革有何影響。再者，我們也探討了央行官員對自身薪資的關心程度，在提高薪資懲罰的過程中，扮演著何種角色。
經由本文的解析，我們可以得到：不論是以通貨膨脹或產出差距做為懲罰央行官員薪資的標準，提高他們的薪資懲罰程度皆可降低經濟體系中複數均衡解存在的可能性；此外，就匯率制度變革的機率而言，我們發現，相較於以通貨膨脹來懲罰央行官員的薪資制度，提高央行官員因產出差距受到的懲罰，能夠較大幅度降低民眾的預期匯率變動率，進而降低匯率制度變革的機率；同時，也大幅提高經濟體系對負面干擾的承受度；最後，央行官員如果愈關心自身的薪資，則提高他們的薪資懲罰所得到的效果將愈大。

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