現代社會中，個人利益與團體利益往往不可同時兼得，因此只謀個人利益、不顧團體利益的行為屢見不鮮。社會心理學中「社會困境」(Social dilemma) 的概念恰可以用來解釋這種自私行為的現象。

過去的研究發現自私行為盛行的主要原因是: (1) 獎賞結構有利於自私行為，(2)合作代價太高， (3) 鼓勵個人利益。因此本研究即探討降低自私行為的因素，從改變獎賞結構作起，降低競爭所帶來的個人利益和合作的代價，藉外加的力量、而視對於自私行為的影響。

本研究的實驗對象是大學生，採取實驗室實驗法，模擬社會困境的情境，獨變項為告知抽查機率與否(告知組、不告知組)，抽查機率高低("高抽查組"平均每三年抽查一次、"低抽查組"平均每六年抽查一次)，懲罰程度(高懲罰組:罰五倍、低懲罰組:罰二倍)。

為了減低受試者之間相互的影響，採取八個實驗處理水準同時呈現的方式，故為2x2x2的受試者內設計。五個主要依變項為第一次嘗試的漁獲量、平均漁獲量、犯規機率、被懲罰的平均數量和抽查前後漁獲量的平均差距。

研究結果發現:

(1) 抽查機率、懲罰程度的主要效果達到顯著水準。即在高抽查機率的情境下，受試者較為合作，他們的「平均漁獲量」較少、「犯規機率」也較低;在高懲罰的情境下，受試者較為合作，他們的「第一次嘗試的漁獲量」較少、「平均漁獲量」較少、「犯規機率」也較低。

(2) 告知抽查機率與否和懲罰程度的交互作用達到顯著水準。即在告知抽查機率的情境下，高懲罰組與低懲罰組于「平均漁獲量」、「抽查前後漁獲量的平均差距」上的差異，大於在不告知抽查機率的情境下，兩組的差異。

(3) 個人動機對合作行為有影響，具有「團體利益取向」的受試者較合作，他們的「第一次嘗試的漁獲量」較少、「平均漁獲量」較少、「犯規機率」也較低、「被懲罰的平均數量」亦較低。而且不同動機的受試者，對於他人動機的預測也不同。受試者具有什麼動機、就會預測他人也具有相同的動機。

(4) 受試者的合作行為與所得利益的滿意程度、欲達到原先目標的困難程度有關。受試者愈不合作、對自己所得利益愈不滿意、且認為欲達到原先目標愈困難。

(5)性別在各個實驗度超水準上的分配並無顯著差異。但是女性較為合作，她們的「第一次嘗試的漁獲量」較少、「平均漁獲量」較少、「被懲罰的平均數量」較少、抽查嘗試之後的漁獲量增加較少。

(6) 受試者的年級、宗教信仰和出生序的效果未達到顯著水準。

(一) 中文部份
莊慧秋(民七十六)。「社會困境之研究--不同誘因型態對合作行為之影響」。國立政治大學心理研究所碩士論文。
陳皎眉(民七十七) 。「從社會困境的理論、實驗與調查看如何減少自私行為」。台北市:正昇教育科學社。
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