當收購者選擇以股票為支付方式進行併購時，為避免股價波動過大影響被收購者被併購之意願，可能納入Collar條款降低股價波動對被收購者所獲對價之影響，以促成併購交易。過去僅少數文獻討論納入Collar條款與併購宣告日短期異常報酬之關聯性，且未有文獻探討該條款對併購後長期績效之影響。本研究以1992-2015年之美國併購案進行分析，探討企業併購時納入Collar條款與併購後長期績效之關聯性，實證結果顯示相對於無納入Collar條款之併購案，納入Collar條款之併購案之併購後長期績效較佳，證實Collar條款能兼顧不同支付方式的優點，可供未來併購實務做為參考。

Collar agreements are merger bids using stock as a method of payment that specify a range within which the bidder’s stock price can fluctuate. Using collar agreements, the bidder undertakes the risk of fluctuations in its stock price in order to facilitate mergers and acquisitions transactions. Using a sample of U.S. merger deals between 1992 and 2015, this paper examines the relations between collar agreements and long-run post-merger performance. Evidence shows that merger bids with the inclusion of collar agreements, compared with those with payment methods without collar agreements, are associated with higher return on assets in the post-merger periods. The findings suggest that collar agreements can mitigate detriment generated by using cash or stocks as a method of payment.

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