這篇論文嘗試討論信念內容如何關涉與其相對應的外在世界。在這過程之中，我們究竟需不需要透過經驗來說明？藉由理解戴維森與麥道爾對於經驗的不同看法來釐清思想信念需不需要經驗的背書以及我們需不需要預設某種經驗的中介物。

第一章將簡述蒯因對經驗主義的評價及改造工作。第二章則看戴維森看如何論述為什麼我們應該拋棄「概念框架與經驗內容的二元論」這經驗主義的第三個教條，以及如何用三角定位來說明思想的客觀性。麥道爾認為認為戴維森拋棄經驗主義的第三個教條是正確的，但付出的代價卻是使自己陷入了某種形式的融貫論。第三章將探索麥道爾如何用其所提出的「簡約的經驗主義」方案來作為戴維森的替代方案。最後一章筆者將論述戴維森並未如麥道爾所指責地掉入融貫論陷阱。另外也對蒯因、戴維森、麥道爾三位哲學家各自的經驗主義核心立場與差異做出說明與比較。

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