超驗論證在哲學史中最著名的使用者無疑是康德，但在當代分析哲學中也有不少使用者，如Putnam(1981)、Davidson(1989)與Lowe(2012)等。本文將著重於探討超驗論證於當代分析哲學中之使用所遇到的問題，而不會處理康德原始版本的超驗論證或涉及哲學史中超驗論證的討論。當代對超驗論證的形式化包含了作為前提之條件句，因此條件句是否為真成為了對超驗論證攻防的焦點。形上立基是近年後設形上學的熱門研究對象，被認為比上世紀形上學討論主流之模態概念更為細緻，但受到了當代超驗論證研究者的忽視而鮮有相關討論。本文指出形上立基關係有助於推進關於超驗論證的討論，使之得以與當前的後設形上學對話，並論證使用形上立基關係的超驗論證較過往模態關係版本的更有可能成功。

The most famous user of transcendental argument in the history of philosophy is undoubtedly Kant, but there are also many users in contemporary analytic philosophy, such as Putnam (1981), Davidson (1989) and Lowe (2012). This article will focus on the problems encountered in the use of transcendental arguments in contemporary analytic philosophy, and will not deal with Kant's original version of the transcendental arguments or involve the discussions of transcendental arguments in the history of philosophy. The contemporary formalization of transcendental arguments includes a conditional statement as premises, so whether the conditional statements are true has become the focus of the discussions of transcendental arguments. Metaphysical grounding has been popular in metametaphysics recent years. It is considered to be more fine-grained than the modal concept that was the mainstream of discussions of metaphysics in the last century. However, it has been ignored by contemporary researchs of transcendental arguments and there is few relevant discussion. This paper points out that metaphysical grounding relations can help advance the discussion of transcendental arguments, allowing them to dialogue with current metametaphysics, and demonstrates that transcendental arguments using metaphysical grounding relations are better and more likely to succeed than the old ones using modal relation.

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