高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。

本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下：

1.董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。

2.公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。

3.機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。

4.總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。

5.公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關。

In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms' top executive with firms'stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses.

Pooling regressions using four years' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows:

1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with.

2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors.

3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis.

4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme.

5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive's cash compensation.