本論文探討克里果(Uriah Kriegel)與佛教《成唯識論》關於表象與意識結構之理論及相關議題與爭點。

專書：
Blackmore, S. (2004). Consciousness: An Introduction. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, eds. (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brook, A. (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fodor, J. A. (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Sussex, Eng.: Harvester Press.
Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi (2008). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London: Routledge.
Kim, J. (2006). Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Kriegel, U. (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriegel, U. and K. Williford, eds. (2006). Self-epresentational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T., ed. (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Petitot, J., F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J. Roy, eds. (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
von Eckardt, B. (1993). What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Williams, P., ed. (2005). Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies. Vol. V. London: Routledge.
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Zelazo, P. D., M. Moscovitch, and E. Thompson, eds. (2007). The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
釋演培 (1989)。《成唯識論講記》。臺北市：天華。
霍韜晦 (1980)。《安慧三十唯識釋原典譯註》。香港：中文大學。
吳汝鈞 (2000)。《佛教的概念與方法》(修訂版)。臺北市：臺灣商務。
吳汝鈞 (2002)。《唯識現象學(一)：世親與護法》。臺北市：臺灣學生。
吳汝鈞 (2006)。《佛學研究方法論》(三版)。臺北市：臺灣學生。
張澄基 (1973)。《佛學今詮》。臺北市：慧炬。
倪梁康 (2002)。《自识与反思: 近现代西方哲学的基本问题》。北京市：商務印書館。
倪梁康[注釋] (2005)。《新譯八識規矩頌》。臺北市：三民。
羅時憲[删注] (1992-93)。《成唯識論述記删注》。香港九龍：佛教法相學會。
井上玄真(著)；白湖旡言(譯) (2011)。《唯識三十論講話》(再版)。臺北市：新文豐。
橫山紘一(著)；許洋山(譯) (2002)。《唯識思想入門》。臺北市：東大。

期刊／論文：
Arnold, D. (2005). Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following Śāntarakṣita. Asian Philosophy 15: 77-111.
Block, N. (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 52-79. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Block, N. (1999). Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.
Philosophical Topics 26 (1): 39-70.
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31-52. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 139-174.
Kellner, B. (2011). Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39: 411–426.
Kern, I. (1988). The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19: 282-295.
Kern, I. (1992). Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang. In D.P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree, and J. Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
MacKenzie, M. (2004). Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy. (doctoral dissertation).
MacKenzie, M. (2007). The Illumination of Consciousness: Approaches to Self-Awareness in the Indian and Western Traditions. Philosophy East & West 57: 40-62.
MacKenzie, M. (2008). Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness. Asian Philosophy 18 (3): 245 – 266.
McGinn, C. (1988). Consciousness and Content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74: 219-239. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Paul, L. A. (2002). Logical Parts. Noûs 36: 578-596.
Shoemaker, S.(1982). The Inverted Spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July): 357-381. Reprinted in Block et al. (1997).
Tye, M. (2007) Philosophical Problems of Consciousness. In M. Velmans and S. Schneider, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
梁益堉 (2007)。“Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character”(概念論與現象特性)。《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》第34期：129-174。
姚治華 (2006)。論陳那的自證說。《現象學與人文科學》3期：51-83 (余振邦正文中譯)。
陳一標 (2003)。唯識學「行相」(AkAra)之研究。「第一屆印度學學術研討會」會議論文。
倪梁康 (2006)。唯識學中「自證分」的基本意涵。《現象學與人文科學》3期：85-110。
倪梁康。最終意識與阿賴耶識──對現象學與唯識學所理解的深層心識結構的
比較研究。
倪梁康。客體化行為與非客體化行為的奠基關係問題──從唯識學和現象學的
角度看“識”與“智”的關係。
耿寧 (1994)。從現象學的角度看唯識三世。中國文哲研究通訊第四卷第一期：6-14。
何宗興。陳那自證理論的分析與闡釋。
http://www.plm.org.hk/e_book/xz-1255.pdf
趙東明 (2006)。陳那「自證」理論探析──兼論《成唯識論》及窺基《成唯
識論述記》的觀點。圓光佛學學報第十期。
釋仁宥。陳那「自證」理論之初探。「台灣哲學學會2008年學術研討會」會議論文。

佛教原典：
會本：《成唯識論》、述記、三種述。(2005)。佛陀教育基金會。
--護法造 玄奘譯《成唯識論》
--窺基《成唯識論述記》
--窺基《成唯識論掌中樞要》
--慧沼《成唯識論了義燈》
--智周《成唯識論演秘》
Hattori, M. (1968). Dignāga, on Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.