對世界各國政府來說，地下經濟是一個扭曲社會資源與稅收的嚴重問題。為了深究地下經濟與經濟學家所關注的總體經濟變數(例如：經濟成長、失業、稅收)之間複雜且與傳統觀念不一致的關係，本論文試圖架構包含地下經濟主要項目(如貪污、逃稅與犯罪)的總體經濟模型，藉以分析其對於總體變數的影響效果。第二章主要的研究目的在於，考慮逃稅行為的存在下，分析減稅政策的動態效果，試圖探討透過減稅擴大稅基以抵消稅收的損失所可能達到的程度為何？在本論文第三章中，將轉換貪污對經濟成長具有「強烈負面」效應的論點，進而討論透過考量貪污因為影響政府投資的有效生產力，進一步分析貪污對經濟成長所造成的正向影響。於第四章中我們建構個體基礎的總體理論模型，說明了為何在實證結果中，不同國家的犯罪率與失業率以及失業率與經濟成長之關係有可能為正向循環或是負向循環。

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