美中科技競爭的加劇已在印太地區產生劇烈的結構性壓力，然而科技導向中等強權（technology-oriented middle powers, TOMPs）的回應方式卻明顯各異。本論文探討科技導向中等強權（TOMPs）在美中科技對抗中為何採取不同的戰略態勢，以及結構性制約如何形塑其能動性（agency）。本文以半導體為核心的印太科技秩序為背景，發展出一項針對台灣與印度的比較案例研究。本論文將TOMP定義為具有全球重要科技能力、在科技價值鏈中占據結構性不可替代地位，並將科技能力作為地緣政治工具運用於治國策略中的中等強權。本文區分出兩種次類型：台灣作為一個以內在扼制點權力（intrinsic chokepoint power）為根基、致力於維持不可或缺性的TOMP；印度則作為一個透過供應鏈整合、市場規模與數位能力尋求位置性籌碼（positional leverage）的包容性、多元化TOMP。科技地緣政治能動性架構（Techno-geopolitical Agency Framework, TGAF）整合了新現實主義（neo-realism）、武器化相互依賴（weaponized interdependence）、科技民族主義（techno-nationalism）與鑲嵌式重商主義治國策略（embedded mercantilist statecraft），以解釋此種差異。本研究採用質性比較案例研究方法，運用政策文件分析、過程追蹤（process tracing）與次級資料綜合分析。本研究的貢獻包括TOMP概念構念、內在性/位置性扼制點（intrinsic/positional chokepoint）之區分，以及以台印半導體協調為例證的「TOMP對TOMP合作」（TOMP-to-TOMP cooperation）概念。本文進一步推進了中等強權能動性、半導體地緣政治，以及戰略性科技競爭下國際政治經濟學等領域的學術研究。

The intensification of US-China technological competition has generated acute structural pressures across the Indo-Pacific, yet technology-oriented middle powers (TOMPs) have responded in markedly divergent ways. This study addresses why technology-oriented middle powers (TOMPs) adopt different strategic postures amid U.S.-China technological rivalry and how structural constraints shape their agency. It develops a comparative case study of Taiwan and India within the semiconductor-centered Indo-Pacific technology order.
The study defines TOMPs as middle powers with globally significant technological capabilities, a structurally non-substitutable position in technology value chains, and statecraft strategies that use technological capability as a geopolitical instrument. It distinguishes two subtypes: Taiwan as an indispensability-preserving TOMP anchored in intrinsic chokepoint power, and India as an inclusive-diversifying TOMP seeking positional leverage through supply-chain integration, market scale, and digital capacity.
The Techno-geopolitical Agency Framework (TGAF) integrates neo-realism, weaponized interdependence, techno-nationalism, and embedded mercantilist statecraft to explain this variation. The study employs qualitative comparative case study methodology, drawing on policy document analysis, process tracing, and secondary source synthesis. The study contributes the TOMP construct, the intrinsic/positional chokepoint distinction, and the concept of TOMP-to-TOMP cooperation, illustrated by Taiwan-India semiconductor coordination. It advances scholarship on middle power agency, semiconductor geopolitics, and international political economy under strategic technological competition.

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