在「商標」與「知識」等無形資產逐漸成為經濟社會中重要生產要素的今日，保障其所有權是維持市場秩序的重要方式之一，為此我國公平交易法第二十條與智慧財產相關法律均有相關規範。本文由政治獻金遊說的角度出發，探討當此類無形資產掌握在外國廠商手中時，本國民選政府如何制定最適的仿冒查緝率。本文研究發現，在沒有利益團體遊說的情況下，本國政府的最適查緝率為零；然若外國正版商的參與政治獻金遊說，即使本國政府對全國福利的重視程度相對於政治獻金兩倍以上，外國正版商的遊說仍可能大幅改變本國政府的選擇，使查緝率大幅提升至仿冒能夠在市場生存的查緝上限；若外國正版商與本國消費者均付出政治獻金遊說，則雙方將會落入類似囚犯的困境中。

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