本研究進行公共財捐獻實驗，共分為三個組別進行，分別給定受試者不同的每人邊際報酬 (marginal per capita returns, i.e., MPCR)，觀察受試者的捐獻決策與最終實驗結果會有何差異。而在實驗中受試者彼此處於組內競爭的關係，在每回合的捐獻決策後，組員彼此以多數決投票的方式決定一位組員出局，因此最終能獲得共同帳戶點數者僅有最後的贏家一人。本實驗共有四個發現，第一：α相同組中所有組員MPCR皆為0.5，實驗結果顯示每位組員的平均捐獻率並無顯著差異。第二：在受試者α不同的組別中，受試者的MPCR不盡相同，而具有高MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較低，而具有低MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較高。第三：在組員的投票決策方面，在α皆異組中六位組員的MPCR皆不相同，而每個階段的實驗中，組員的出局順序呈現由MPCR最高至低，最後反而是MPCR低的組員獲勝的機會最高。α兩同組中則是六位組員MPCR兩兩相同，實驗結果顯示MPCR處於整組中間的組員佔據較高勝率。第四：不論是哪個組別的實驗，都顯示隨著實驗的進行，受試者的平均捐獻率皆呈現逐漸下降的趨勢，此結果和未競爭的公共財實驗相同。

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