近來反避稅浪潮興起，促使各界再度檢視公司租稅規避的行為。關係人交易不透明且複雜的特性，常被公司用以進行不當的利益安排，達到減輕稅負的目的。本研究採用台灣上市電子業公司2013-2014年的關係人交易資料，探討關係人交易與租稅規避的關聯性。本研究將關係人交易類型分成簡單與複雜兩種類型。並將關係人分為關係個人、關係個體，更進一步將關係個體分為其他關係個體及集團企業型態。實證結果顯示公司與其他關係個體進行簡單交易時，稅規避程度較高。可以推論公司與不同關係人進行不同交易類型的避稅效果不同。

Due to the emerging of anti-tax avoidance, the act of companies arranging tax avoidance is being examined. Related party transaction is complicated and nontransparent, therefore companies often use it to undergo inappropriate interest arrangement to ease tax burden. This research examines the related party transactions of Taiwan public electronic companies from 2013 to 2014 to study the relationship between related party transaction and tax avoidance. This research divides transactions into two types, simple and complicated. Related parties are divided into individual and enterprise, and enterprise are further divided into other related enterprise and conglomerate. Research shows higher tax avoidance when companies adopt simple transaction with other related enterprise. In solution this research infers tax avoidance effects will differ when types of transactions and related parties are different.

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