有關市場經濟的文獻早已汗牛充棟，相較之下，組織經濟是一個較受

到忽視與待開發的領域。本文以三個模型來探討經濟組織的形成及組織與

市場的差異。在第一個模型中，我們承續Olson(1965)、Alchian and

Dem- sets(1972)和Kandel and Lazear(1992)的理論，說明在聯合生產中

，不同機制克服搭便車行為的效果，我們比教了三種理想型的機制：市場

（價格機能）、道德（同儕壓力）和層級組織，藉以說明組織的利益。在

第二個模型中，吾人藉由一個賽局模型比較了不同生產方式對形成雇傭關

係的影響，說明在單期和多期模型中，自營生產和聯合生產對雇傭關係的形成有何不同的影響。在第三個模型中我們探討了組織與市場究竟有何「本質」上的差異。首先吾人定義兩種不同的系統：集中的與分散的資訊系統。前者係以Simon (1967)的階層分解原則來定義經濟組織的資訊特色，後者則較接近無組織或是「市場」經濟體系。然後我們藉由模型的比較表明組織與市場在資訊上的差異。吾人的模型可視為對Hayek(1945)、Coase(1937)以及Sah and Stiglitz(1986)關於組織與市場結論的補充與註解。我們並將結論的一個引申與Lawrence and Lorsch(1967)關於組織與環境關係的結論加以比較：在我們的模型中，Lawrence andLorsch(1967)的結論只是環境景氣平均數大於零的一個特例。不過這仍是一個有待進一步驗證的結論。

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