本文透過Palazzo (2012) 之模型，檢視台灣上市上櫃公司之現金持有率變動程度是否與風險溢酬存在正向關係。當我們使用剩餘所得模型所估計出隱含資金成本作為風險溢酬時，符合Palazzo (2012) 預防性動機之預期，公司在面臨高風險時，傾向增加其現金持有，以備面臨流動性危機。而使用已實現報酬模型作為風險溢酬之估計時，則無法解釋正向且顯著地解釋，與Black (1993), Elton (1999) 及 Fama and French (1997) 之論點一致，已實現報酬並非預期報酬良好之估計；而採用現金持有波動度作為風險之代理變數時，亦無法正向地解釋當期現金持有變動情況。此外，並發現公司之現金持有率變動受風險影響程度與公司之未來投資機會有關，未來投資機會較多的廠商其預期報酬與現金持有政策有較大的正向關係。

中文部分
張介銘(2004)，「持續性高現金儲備政策對公司長期營運績效與長期股價之影響」，國立成功大學企業管理學系博士論文。
劉金鳳、蘇育玲與黃國志(2008) 「以資本資產訂價模式分析海運業資金成本與風險之關係」，中華管理評論國際學報，11-1，1-21。
胡偉哲(2012)，「為什麼台灣公司的現金比率逐年增加? 」，國立中央大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
潘為萃(2013)，「台灣股票報酬和現金持有的關聯性」，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
陳玉慧(2013)，「權益資金成本之估計-橫斷面資料的應用」，國立政治大學國際經營與貿易研究所碩士論文。
賴孜玟(2013)「初次上市(櫃)公司於興櫃市場期間股權結構及現金持有率對未來公司績效之研究」，國立成功大學高階管理專班碩士論文。

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