近年來，台資銀行在全球低利率環境下積極拓展海外商用不動產（Commercial Real Estate, CRE）授信業務，尤以歐美成熟市場為主要布局對象。然而，新冠疫情（COVID-19）爆發後，商用不動產需求結構出現顯著變化，加以主要央行自 2022 年起快速升息，使融資成本上升並壓抑資產估值，導致多起海外 CRE 授信案件發生違約，銀行因此承受顯著的大額信用損失。實務經驗顯示，部分最終產生鉅額呆帳之案件，在核貸初期仍具備合理的貸款價值比（LTV）、充足的利息保障倍數（DSCR）及良好的出租率，突顯僅依賴傳統財務指標，已不足以有效辨識極端環境下的潛在風險。
本研究以台資銀行於美國、英國、加拿大及澳洲之商用不動產授信案件為研究對象，建構一套結構性風險評分模型，納入出租率、租戶集中度、加權平均租約到期年限（WALE）及貸款價值比（LTV）等關鍵指標，作為補充傳統財務比率之風險辨識工具。研究結果顯示，結構性風險指標對於辨識高槓桿、租約結構脆弱或租戶集中度偏高之案件，具有較佳的前瞻性。
此外，本研究指出，風險控管不應僅止於貸放前之授信審查，貸放後管理機制同樣關鍵。若銀行能於貸後階段透過定期風險評測、壓力測試及到期前階段性檢核，動態掌握租約、估值與融資條件之變化，將有助於及早啟動因應措施，降低風險累積並減少最終信用損失。

In recent years, Taiwanese banks have actively expanded their overseas commercial real estate (CRE) lending under a prolonged low interest rate environment, with a particular focus on mature markets in Europe and the United States. However, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, structural changes in demand for commercial real estate emerged. At the same time, rapid interest rate hikes initiated by major central banks since 2022 significantly increased financing costs and exerted downward pressure on asset valuations. As a result, multiple overseas CRE lending cases defaulted, causing Taiwanese banks to incur substantial credit losses. Practical experience indicates that several loans which ultimately resulted in large losses initially exhibited sound financial indicators, including reasonable loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, sufficient debt service coverage ratios (DSCR), and high occupancy rates. This highlights the limitations of relying solely on traditional financial metrics to identify latent risks under extreme market conditions.
This study examines overseas CRE lending cases of Taiwanese banks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and develops a structural risk scoring model incorporating key indicators such as occupancy rate, tenant concentration, weighted average lease expiry (WALE), and loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The model is designed to complement traditional financial ratios and enhance risk identification. The results demonstrate that structural risk indicators provide superior forward-looking insights, particularly in identifying loans with high leverage, fragile lease structures, or excessive tenant concentration.
Furthermore, this study emphasizes that effective risk management should not be limited to pre-lending credit assessment. Post-lending management mechanisms are equally critical. By implementing regular risk assessments, stress testing, and phased pre-maturity reviews, banks can dynamically monitor changes in lease structures, asset valuations, and refinancing conditions. Such measures facilitate early intervention, mitigate risk accumulation, and ultimately reduce the likelihood and severity of credit losses.

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