本篇論文探討供應鏈董事連結是否有助於緩解供應鏈挾持問題，以2003年至2023年美國上市公司資料做實證分析，實證顯示隨著供應鏈董事連結強度上升，供應鏈關係的強度與時間長度皆顯著提升。此外，供應鏈董事連結也放大了上游與下游方向的公司估值的外溢效果。實證顯示，董事連結可以作為一個非合約的諮詢與治理機制，該機制減少了供應鏈中的機會主義行為，並促進了價值傳遞與創造。

This thesis investigates whether board interlocks mitigate supply chain hold-ups. Using data of U.S. publicly listed firms from 2003 to 2023, I find that interlock intensity significantly increases relationship stability and duration. Interlocking directors also amplify valuation spillovers in both upstream and downstream directions. As for the underlying mechanism, my findings suggest that board interlock serves as a non-contractual board advisory governance channel. This mechanism reduces opportunism and fosters value creation in vertical supply chain relationships.

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