| 研究生: |
陳聖方 Chen, Sheng-Fang |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
制度規則下的資本錯置:關於租賃業監理、企業資本使用與銀行授信政策的三篇論文 Capital Misallocation under Institutional Rules: Three Essays on Lessor Regulation, Firm Capital Utilization, and Bank Lending Policy |
| 指導教授: |
李文傑
Lee, Wen-Chieh |
| 口試委員: |
李文傑
Lee, Wen-Chieh 王信實 Wang, Shinn-Shyr 李浩仲 Li, Hao-Chung 張景福 Chang, Ching-Fu 蔡宜展 Tsai, Yi-Chan |
| 學位類別: |
博士
Doctor |
| 系所名稱: |
社會科學學院 - 經濟學系 Department of Economics |
| 論文出版年: | 2026 |
| 畢業學年度: | 114 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 91 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 資本錯置 、制度規則 、租賃業監理 、資本適足性 、資本使用 、放款成數 、擔保品品質 、社會福利 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | capital misallocation, institutional rules, lessor regulation, capital adequacy, capital utilization, loan-to-value ratio, collateral quality, social welfare |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:46 下載:0 |
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本論文包含三篇文章,探討制度規則如何影響異質廠商與借款人之間的資本配置,以及由此產生的資本錯置。三篇文章以銀行、租賃商與資本使用者之間的關係為共同架構。銀行提供資金,租賃商提供資本服務,廠商或借款人將資本用於生產。三篇文章分別探討租賃公司的監理方式、耐久財的所有權結構,以及擔保授信中的放款成數規則。共同問題是,規則與契約選擇可能將資本在異質資本使用者之間重新配置。當規則或契約所依據的分類未能反映與產出相關的異質性時,這種重新配置可能降低社會福利。
第一篇〈租賃業監理與資本錯置〉研究銀行對租賃公司曝險採用單一監理風險權數是否會在不同類型的租賃商之間造成資本錯置。生產性租賃商向下游廠商提供資本服務,這些服務投入下游廠商的生產並影響最終產出。消費性租賃商則向家戶提供消費性租賃服務,這些服務進入家戶效用。本文顯示,以差異化風險權數取代單一風險權數,會將資本重新配置至生產性租賃商,並提升總產出與社會福利。
第二篇〈購置或租賃耐久財:成本結構、錯置與福利〉研究耐久財的所有權結構如何影響景氣衰退期間的資本使用率。本文顯示,需求下降時,自有比重較高的飛機機型,其飛行服務流量下降幅度較大。這種所有權結構可能在廠商內部產生資本錯置。
第三篇〈依擔保品品質差異化之放款成數、銀行損失與社會福利〉研究以擔保品為基礎的放款成數規則。本文顯示,當借款人在生產力與擔保品品質兩個面向皆具有異質性時,使銀行的期望損失最小化的授信規則可能降低產出與社會福利。
This dissertation contains three essays on institutional rules, heterogeneous firms and borrowers, and capital misallocation. The essays study capital allocation through the relationships among banks, lessors, and capital users. Banks provide funding, lessors provide capital services, and firms or borrowers use capital in production. The three essays examine the supervisory treatment of leasing companies, the ownership structure of durable assets, and the loan-to-value rules used in collateralized lending. The common issue is that rules and contractual choices may reallocate capital across heterogeneous capital users. When the relevant classifications do not match the heterogeneity that determines output, the resulting allocation may reduce social welfare.
The first essay, ``Regulation and Capital Misallocation in Leasing,'' studies whether applying a uniform supervisory risk weight to banks' exposures to leasing companies generates capital misallocation across lessor types. Productive lessors provide capital services to downstream firms. These services enter firms' production and therefore affect final output. Consumer lessors provide leasing services to households. These services enter household utility. The essay shows that replacing a uniform risk weight with differentiated risk weights raises aggregate output and social welfare by reallocating capital toward productive lessors.
The second essay, ``Purchasing versus Leasing Durable Assets: Cost Structure, Misallocation, and Welfare,'' studies how the ownership structure of durable assets affects capital utilization during downturns. The essay shows that, when demand falls, aircraft types with higher owned shares experience larger declines in flight-hour service flow. This ownership composition can generate within-firm capital misallocation.
The third essay, ``Quality-Based LTV Differentiation, Bank Loss, and Welfare,'' studies collateral-based loan-to-value rules. The essay shows that, when borrowers differ in both productivity and collateral quality, the lending rule that minimizes expected bank loss may reduce output and social welfare.
1 Introduction 1
2 Regulation and Capital Misallocation in Leasing 3
2.1 Introduction 3
2.2 Model and Analytical Framework 4
2.3 Data and Calibration 12
2.4 The Baseline Quantitative Economy 17
2.5 Counterfactual Analysis 18
2.6 Conclusion 21
2.A Proofs 23
2.B Sensitivity Analysis 23
3 Purchasing versus Leasing Durable Assets: Cost Structure, Misallocation, and Welfare 26
3.1 Introduction 26
3.2 Model 28
3.3 Data and Empirical Design 34
3.4 Empirical Results 40
3.5 Misallocation and Welfare 44
3.6 Conclusion 48
3.A Proofs 49
3.B Additional Empirical Results 50
4 Quality-Based LTV Differentiation, Bank Loss, and Welfare 57
4.1 Introduction 57
4.2 Model 59
4.3 Bank Loss, Lending Allocation, and Welfare 63
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 74
4.A Proofs 75
4.B Output and Welfare Decomposition 76
4.C Derivations for the Bad-Collateral LTV Increase 78
4.D Shadow-Price Interpretation in the Continuous Limit 81
5 Conclusion 84
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全文公開日期 2031/08/10