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| 研究生： |
邱怡靜 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
雙重股權結構對公司聯合貸款條件之影響－以美國公司為例 The Impact of Dual-Class Structure on the Contract Terms of Syndicated Loans – Evidence from US Firms |
| 指導教授： | 張元晨 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 財務管理學系 Department of Finance |
| 論文出版年： | 2016 |
| 畢業學年度： | 104 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 38 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 雙重股權 、公司治理 、權利分離 、聯合貸款 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | dual-class, corporate governance, rights divergence, syndicated loan |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：51 下載：12 |
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雙重股權結構現今於美國公司治理上的應用越來越普遍，在此股權結構下的公司透過具不同投票權的股票達到控制權與盈餘分配權分離，使內部經理人可以掌握公司的控制權，但相應而生的可能是經理人與股東間的代理問題，且並非所有等級的股票皆公開在市場上交易，這也使得公司資訊透明度降低，進而影響股票的流動性和公司價值，然而，對於雙重股權結構亦有研究持正面看法，如公司可藉控制權集中提升經營效率等。本研究由此為出發點，欲以聯貸市場的角度來檢驗雙重股權結構公司在進行聯貸時，是否會對聯貸條件產生影響，而貸款銀行面對公司的雙重股權結構又將採取何種風險評估角度。
本研究利用1991至2012年間美國公司的資料，研究結果顯示公司在雙重股權結構下，所獲得之聯貸條件並未呈現負面影響，其中原因可能存在於雙重股權結構的公司特性與其可能為公司創造的價值。
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究主題 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 4
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 雙重股權結構 5
第二節 研究假說 8
第三章 研究方法 10
第一節 樣本篩選標準與資料來源 10
第二節 樣本說明 12
第三節 變數說明 16
第四節 研究方法 17
第四章 實證結果 19
第一節 樣本敘述統計 19
第二節 配對T檢定 20
第三節 聯貸條件之複迴歸分析 25
第五章 結論與建議 30
第一節 研究結論 30
第二節 未來研究建議 31
參考文獻 33
附錄 35
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