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| 研究生： |
許修懷 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
社會網路、買賣、與中介 The Buyer-Seller-Intermediary Network |
| 指導教授： | 莊委桐 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 經濟學系 Department of Economics |
| 論文出版年： | 2009 |
| 畢業學年度： | 98 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 34 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 社會網路 、中介 、買賣網路 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | buyer-seller network |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：132 下載：33 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
在網路架構下的 first-price 買賣，加入了中介，這裡建構買家二階段的決策，並且探討買家的 連結數、 valuation 、連結成本、 bid 之間的關係。在本文中，中介對想要向中介連結的買家收取費用，接著找出最適的費用以及與其他變數之間的關係，接著在一些額外的假設下找出其配對方法。最後在不同買家 valuation 分配下發現變數間的關係是一致的。
In buyer-seller network, on empirical premise, each buyer and seller must
have a relationship, that is "link," to exchange a good. Each buyer should
choose whether to link or not and choose how many links he or she should have.
In this paper, we introduce an intermediary in the buyer-seller network. Buyers can construct links by themselves, or they can exchange through an intermediary. On the other hand, the intermediary also charges an entrance fee for its service. We then discuss the intermediaries' behavior and define the allocation rule. We find the intermediary allocation rule achieves maximal profit for the intermediary but this rule cannot reach the maximal total surplus. We also characterize the relationship between link cost, buyers' valuation, the optimal number of links, and the payoff of the buyer and intermediary.
Introduction 4
2 Model 6
2.1 Buyer's Behavior I 6
2.2 Buyers' Behavior II and Algorithm 10
2.3 Simulation 11
3 Intermediary 15
3.1 Intermediary and Optimal Fee 15
3.2 Algorithm 16
4 Intermediary Behavior and Allocation Rule 17
5 Buyer's behavior III and Intermediary 22
6 Simulation 22
6.1 Simulation and Optimal Fee 22
6.2 Simulation and Algorithm 24
6.3 Simulation and Distribution 26
7 Conclusion 30
Appendix 30
Reference 34
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