Abstract

Based on the sequential auction model of Kyle (1985) and embedded the formulation of positive feedback traders in De Long et al. (1990), our model formulates a recursive market game of insiders, noise traders, and market makers. In particular, the submitted demands of positive feedback inertial traders are influenced by previous own trading quantities. I prove the existence and uniqueness of a recursive linear equilibrium with positive feedback inertial trades. Further, the equilibrium calibrates that the strategies of insider and market makers are also influenced by positive feedback trades. Finally, we conduct a simulation analysis to get a price-volume pattern with some empirical interesting implications.

Finally, this thesis takes trading strategies to trade the individual stock in TSEC. Although the market mechanism of TSEC has no market makers, it is still expected that these trading strategies are useful for traders which implies the information is filtrated by these trading strategies.

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