本研究以我國「擴大書面審核制度」為背景，分析營利事業在查核不確定性下，為維持擴大書審資格所作之申報決策。本文採用自然對數效用函數，以刻畫營利事業之風險趨避偏好。由於我國營利事業若要適用擴大書審制度，須同時符合申報收入門檻與法定標準純益率之規定，本文遂將兩項制度條件納入模型。據此，營利事業之申報選擇不僅取決於當期稅負，亦同時受到制度資格與查核風險之影響。
本文獲致三項主要結果。第一，在自然對數效用函數及本文不對稱稽徵設定下，若相同的申報所得調整可由收入項目達成，則高報成本費用不構成最適策略。第二，當法定標準純益率限制具有約束力時，最適申報組合將位於純益率邊界。若申報收入門檻亦具有約束力，申報收入與申報成本費用將共同由制度邊界決定，形成門檻邊界聚集申報的現象；若收入門檻未具約束力，申報成本費用則須隨申報收入調整，使原有的雙變數最適化問題轉化為沿純益率邊界求解的一維最適化問題。第三，在本文設定的對數效用函數與參數組合下，相較於一般隨機查核制度，營利事業在擴大書審制度下是否可獲得較高效用具有條件性，並非在所有情境下均成立。
本文之分析顯示，擴大書審制度不僅是簡化稽徵程序的行政工具，其收入門檻與標準純益率亦會限制營利事業對申報工具的選擇，並影響申報結果是否集中於制度邊界。本文藉由納入風險趨避偏好、區分不同約束狀態，求取營利事業在擴大書審制度下的最適申報策略，並比較營利事業進入一般隨機查核制度與擴大書審制度之間接效用，說明在本文設定之參數組合下，擴大書審制度所形成的相對效用優勢具有條件性。

This study examines the reporting decisions of risk-averse profit-seeking enterprises that attempt to maintain their eligibility for the Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax under uncertainty.. A natural logarithmic utility function is employed to characterize the risk-averse preferences of profit-seeking enterprises. To qualify for Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax, an enterprise must simultaneously satisfy the reported revenue threshold and the standard profit rate requirement. Accordingly, both institutional eligibility conditions are incorporated into the theoretical model. Under this framework, enterprises’ reporting decisions depend not only on their current tax liabilities but also on the joint effects of institutional eligibility requirements and audit risk.
This study yields three main findings. First, under the natural logarithmic utility function and the asymmetric tax enforcement setting adopted in this study, overstating costs and expenses does not constitute an optimal strategy. Second, when the standard profit rate constraint is binding, the optimal combination of reported revenue and reported costs and expenses lies on the profit rate boundary. If the reported revenue threshold is also binding, reported revenue and reported costs and expenses are jointly determined by the institutional boundaries, resulting in the clustering of reported values at the threshold boundary. If the revenue threshold is not binding, reported costs and expenses must adjust in accordance with reported revenue, thereby reducing the original two-variable optimization problem to a one-dimensional optimization problem along the profit rate boundary. Third, under the natural logarithmic utility specification and the parameter combinations adopted in this study, whether a profit-seeking enterprise obtains higher utility under Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax than under the general random audit system is conditional and does not hold across all scenarios.
The findings indicate that Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax is not merely an administrative mechanism for simplifying tax assessment procedures. Its revenue threshold and standard profit rate requirement also restrict enterprises’ choice of reporting instruments and affect whether reported outcomes are concentrated at the boundaries. By incorporating risk-averse preferences, distinguishing among different binding-constraint regimes, and deriving the optimal reporting strategies of profit-seeking enterprises under Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax, this study further compares the indirect utility derived under the general random audit system with that derived under Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax. The results demonstrate that, under the parameter combinations specified in this study, the relative utility advantage associated with the Audit by Reviewing Declaration on Tax is conditional rather than universal.

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