This thesis develops a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and considers the search cost for consumption in order to analyze how advertising influences the major macroeconomic variables and causes the entry barriers. In the short run, we find that advertising will raise aggregate output. The higher the sensitivity of advertising elasticity of search cost, the greater the rising of aggregate output. Further, whether the price level rise or fall is dependent on the magnitude of the advertising elasticity of search cost. The higher sensitivity of this elasticity on advertising, the higher the price level. Moreover, advertising does not influence the market power in the short run. In the long run, we find that whether advertising causes the barriers to entry is determined by the sensitivity of the advertising elasticity of search cost. When this elasticity is small, advertising will create the entry barriers and further strengthen the monopoly power for firms. Furthermore, how advertising affects the price level and aggregate output depends not only on the advertising elasticity of search cost, but also the sensitivity of the elasticity of substitution on the number of firms.

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