本文聚焦2018至2023年間美中科技競爭的背景，選取半導體與人工智慧兩大核心技術，並以攻勢現實主義視角探討在國際無政府狀態下大國追求權力極大化的邏輯。半導體與人工智慧為21世紀經濟增長、軍事現代化及國際規範制定的關鍵技術，亦成美中權力轉移中的競爭核心。本研究主要探討美中科技競爭是否意味全球權力轉移論之實踐，現存霸權國（如美國）藉由科技壓制崛起國（如中國）以維持其優勢。自2018年起第一屆川普政府科技戰政策至拜登政府對華政策之延續，及中國如何推動科技自主的過程，結合文獻分析、案例研究及政策比較，探索中美雙方通過科技競爭同時也增強地緣政治影響力。 研究進一步檢視中美科技競爭對全球供應鏈重組與國際秩序的影響，並評估其他國家的角色，及引發地緣政治格局之變化，進一步推動中美兩全球戰略之調整。

This paper explores the context of the technological competition between the United States and China from 2018 to 2023, with a particular emphasis on semiconductors and artificial intelligence as two crucial technological domains. Employing an offensive realist framework, it examines the behavior of major powers striving to maximize their influence within an anarchic international system. Semiconductors and artificial intelligence are identified as key technologies underpinning economic growth, military modernization, and the evolution of international norms in the twenty-first century, thereby serving as focal points in the US-China power transition rivalry. The research primarily aims to assess whether the technological contest between the United States and China exemplifies the global power transition theory, wherein established hegemonic states, such as the United States, utilize technological advancements to constrain emerging powers, such as China, in order to preserve their dominant status. This study examines the US-China technology war from the first Trump administration in 2018 to the continuation of the Biden administration's China policy, and how China has promoted technological self-reliance. Through literature review, case studies, and policy comparisons, it explores how both the US and China enhance their geopolitical influence through technological competition. The study further examines the impact of US-China technological competition on global supply chain restructuring and the international order, assesses the role of other countries, and explores the resulting changes in the geopolitical landscape, ultimately driving adjustments to the global strategies of both the US and China.

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二、英文部分
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（三）智庫報告
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（四）官方文件
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（五）新聞報導
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Brads-her, K. (2018). 'Made in China 2025' Plan Is Getting a Big, Secretive Push. The New York Times, June 25. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/business/china-technology-industrial-revolution.html>
Hornby, L., & Hancock, T. (2018). What is Made in China 2025' and why is it controversial? Financial Times, May 30.<https://www.ft.com/content/2b695e5c-4c90-11e8-97b4-639c1bdd6f7c>

Manuel, A. & Hicks, K. (2024). Can China's Military Win the Tech War? How the United States Should—and Should Not—Counter Beijing's Civil-Military Fusion. Foreign Affairs, July 29. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-29/can-chinas-military-win-tech-war>
Sevastopulo, D. & Hille, K. (2022). US chips away at Beijing's tech ambitions. Financial Times, October 7. <https://www.ft.com/content/0aec96f7-21d4-4e49-85a4-8c72d90d0e17>
Shepardson, D. & Lee, J. (2022). Exclusive: U.S. lines up allies for chip push against China - sources. Reuters, March 28. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-us-lines-up-allies-chip-push-against-china-sources-2022-03-28>

（六）網際網路
Brands, Hal、Rush Doshi、Randall Schriver、Ray Takeyh（2022）。Alliance in Competitive Strategies。Washington, DC：American Enterprise Institute（AEI）<https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/alliance-in-competitive-strategies/>
CrowdStrike（2022）。Global Threat Report: Focus on China-Linked APTs。CrowdStrike，February 22, <https://www.crowdstrike.com/global-threat-report/>
de La Bruyère, Emily、Nathan Picarsic（2021）。The Inevitability of Decoupling。Horizon Advisory，September 28, <https://www.horizonadvisory.org/post/the-inevitability-of-decoupling>
European Parliament（2021）。The US ‘Small Yard, High Fence’ Approach to China: Implications for Europe。European Parliament, <
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653658/EXPO_STU(2021)653658_EN.pdf>
Mandiant（2023）。M-Trends 2023: Special Report on APT Groups。Mandiant，April 18, <https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports/m-trends-2023>
Osborn, Kris（2019, December 15）。Artificial Intelligence Is Going to Make America’s F-35 and B-2 Even Stronger。The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/artificial-intelligence-going-make-americas-f-35-and-b-2-even-stronger-104967>
Tellis, Ashley J.（2019, October 3）。The Forgotten Dimension of Strategy: Embracing the Use of Power in the Indo-Pacific。Washington, DC：Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/03/forgotten-dimension-of-strategy-embracing-use-of-power-in-indo-pacific-pub-79936>
Tiku, Nitasha（2018, October 15）。Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Says Tech Companies Should Work with the Pentagon。Wired, <https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-jeff-bezos-says-tech-companies-should-work-with-the-pentagon/>
Wang, Dan（2022, December 14）。The Unintended Consequences of America’s Tech War on China。The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/12/us-china-tech-competition-semiconductor-export-controls/672364/>
Williams, Robert D.（2022, December 5）。“Small Yard, High Fence”: The Biden Administration’s Emerging Strategy on China Tech Competition。Lawfare,<https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/small-yard-high-fence-the-biden-administrations-emerging-strategy-on-china-tech-competition>