在相關之傳統職位晉升的研究中，多數只有討論一位員工獲得晉升的情況。Chen(2003)建立一模型，分析當員工彼此間具有負面攻擊競爭對手的情形下，得到正面實力最強的員工遭遇到其他競爭對手最多的負面總攻擊現象，易造成正面能力最強的員工不易獲得晉升的結果。本文則考慮當獲得晉升的員工不只一位時之狀況，發現當員工能力異質時，晉升超過一位員工之制度將使正面能力最強之員工較不會獲得最多之負面攻擊而易於獲得晉升；但當員工能力同質時，只晉升一位員工是對公司最有利的制度。

Baker, G., M. Gibbs and B. Holmstorm (1994),“The Internal Economics of a Firm：Evidence from Personal Data,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 881-919.
Bognanno, M. L. (1999), “Corporate Tournament, ”Journal of LaboEconomics, 19, 290-315.
Chen, K.-P. (2005), “External Recruitment as an Incentive Device, ”Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
Chen, K. -P. (2003), “Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments,”Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 19, 119-140.
DeVaro, J. (2002), “Promotion Tournament in Real Firms, ”mimeo, Cornell University.
Eriksson, T. (1999),“Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Test on Danish Data, ”Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 262-80.
Green, J. and N. Stokey (1983),“A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, ”Journal of Political Economy, 91, 349-64.
Harring, J. J. and G. D. Hess (1996), “A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning, ” Games and Economic Behavior, 17, 209-29.
Hvide, H. K. (2002), “Tournament and risk taking, ” Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 877-98.
Lazear, E. P. and S. Rosen (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, ”Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64.
Malcomson, J. (1984), “Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets. ” Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64.
Prendergast, C. (1993), “The role of promotion in including specific human capital, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 528-34.
Skaperdas, S. and B. Grofman (1995), “Modeling Negative Campaigning, ”American Political Science Review, 89, 49-61.
Zabojnik, J. and D. Bernhardt ( 2001 ), “Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relaion, ” Review of Economic studies, 68, 693-716.