從量與從價稅兩種稅制之比較一直都是被廣泛討論的租稅議題，然而從量關稅與從價關稅福利比較之文獻卻相對較少。本文即在出口國廠商可以透過作帳來隱匿價格的情況下進行從量關稅與從價關稅福利之比較。由於在從價關稅下廠商有誘因透過作帳來隱匿價格，然而在從量關稅制度下廠商則沒有誘因，此一性質將會造成二種關稅政策福利效果的差異。從進口國社會福利水準的觀點來看，除了傳統的經濟效果外，相對從量關稅制度，從價關稅制度會提供廠商隱匿價格的誘因進而降低本國政府的關稅收入，導致從價稅制並不一定優於從量稅制，換言之，傳統從價稅優於從量稅之論點不必然會成立。

The comparison of the specific and ad valorem tax has been a widely discussed issue of taxation. However, there is little literature about the welfare comparison of specific and ad valorem tariff. This paper compares the specific tariff and the ad valorem tariff welfare when exporters can conceal the real price through doing fake accounting. Under the ad valorem tariff, exporters have incentives to conceal prices through accounting. On the contrary, exporters have no incentive under the specific tariff. This property brings differences in the welfare comparison of the two tariff systems. From the import country point of view, in addition to the traditional economic effects, the ad valorem tariff will provide exporters incentive to conceal prices and thereby reduce the domestic tariff revenue. As a result, the ad valorem tax system is not necessarily better than the specific tax system. In other words, the traditional proposition that the ad valorem tax is superior to the specific tax is not necessarily true.

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