世界主要國家忽視實證研究證明國際制裁及發展援助效果有限，反而一再使用相同策略，為探究其中原因，本論文評認觀察對象不應侷限於行為國與目標國二方，作用效果亦非僅著重觀察目標國；依據訊號理論及傳訊賽局理論，制裁、援助均係行為國發送的訊號，真正意圖在向第三方傳達訊號，冀達到行為國預期效果，例如影響第三方對目標國的政策，或向第三方展現行為國對目標國具有影響力等。
為檢驗制裁、援助的訊號效果，區分為整體效果及個案效果。整體效果，以各國是否受美國、聯合國制裁、中國援助為例，觀察對於各國貿易額、獲取援贈額的影響力。個案效果，以美國制裁北韓，中國援助北韓為例，觀察美、中的真正意圖。
經爬梳美、中政府、聯合國等公告文件內容與數據統計分析，並訪談重要關係人，結果發現，157國對外貿易額與是否受美國或聯合國制裁具負相關，亦即制裁將減少其他國家與受制裁國貿易，但制裁對援助具正向關係，將促使其他國家對受制裁國增加援贈款，判係其他國家為避免連帶遭到國際制裁，多限縮與被制裁國之貿易往來，然基於人道救援等因素，而提高援助金額。
有關中國對外援助的訊號效果，142國獲得中國援助與該等對外貿易額呈現顯著負相關，但會增加其他國家提供援贈款，主因中國選擇援助的目標國，原本即屬貿易額較低且需人道援助的國家；而中國援助經常帶有外交及政治目的，亦可產生外溢效果，為受援國吸引更多國際以援助或其他合作方式，投入更多資金。
美國及聯合國明確針對北韓發布制裁措施，但真實意圖在於警告中國勿涉入北韓不法活動，例如制裁北韓文件包含譴責中國及其實體；另據受訪者陳述及學者分析，中國透由各種隱匿、不法手段持續援助（或協助）北韓，旨在向北韓表明鞏固雙邊關係之決心，以及向美國展現中國對北韓及朝鮮半島和平穩定具有影響力。
綜上，國際制裁與發展援助的訊號效果，主要在於向第三方發揮警（宣）示作用，倘能發揮影響第三方決策的效果，則世界主要國家將持續實施相同政策。

Although extensive research has demonstrated that international sanctions and development assistance have limited effects, these policies instruments are still widely adopted by many Western countries. To explain this puzzle, this dissertation argues that research should not only focus on the dyadic relationship between sender states and target states. Drawing on signaling theory and signaling game theory, this study conceptualizes sanctions and assistance as signals that sender states send to third parties, with the aim of influencing third-party policies toward the target state or demonstrating the sender’s influence over the target.
This study examines the signaling effects of sanctions and assistance at both the aggregate and case-specific levels. At the aggregate level, this study examines whether countries subject to U.S. or UN sanctions, or those receiving Chinese foreign assistance, experience changes in trade volumes and foreign aid inflows. At the case level, this study focuses on American sanctions against North Korea and Chinese assistance to North Korea to assess the underlying strategic intentions of the U.S. and China.
Based on official documents issued by the U.S., China, and the UN, combined with a statistical analysis of 157 countries and interviews with key stakeholders, the findings show that among 157 countries, exposure to U.S. or UN sanctions is negatively correlated with trade volumes. While sanctions reduce trade between sanctioned states and third-party countries, they are positively associated with foreign aid inflows, as third-party countries tend to increase assistance. This pattern suggests that although third parties restrict trade to avoid secondary sanctions of the U.S., they tend to increase aid provision due to humanitarian considerations.
An analysis of 142 countries shows that receiving Chinese assistance is negatively associated with trade volumes but positively associated with aid from other countries. This reflects China’s tendency to provide aid to countries with low trade volumes and high humanitarian needs. Moreover, Chinese assistance is often tied to diplomatic and political goals, creating spillover effects that attract additional international assistance or cooperation.
Although the U.S. and the UN explicitly impose sanctions on North Korea, this study argues that their underlying intent is to signal warnings to China against involvement in North Korea’s illicit activities, as shown in the sanction reports that explicitly criticize China and Chinese entities. This study further suggest that China continues to assist North Korea through covert or illicit means, signaling its commitment to their bilateral relationship while simultaneously demonstrating to the U.S. that China retains influence over North Korea and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Overall, this study concludes that the primary signaling effects of international sanctions and development assistance are directed toward third parties. If these instruments are effective at influencing third-party decision-making, Western countries are likely to continue employing sanctions and assistance despite their limited direct impact on target states.

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楊昇儒（2025年9月4日）。習近平與金正恩會談強調無論形勢變化兩國友好不變。中央社。https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202509040358.aspx。
劉詠樂（2024年6月30日）。北韓經濟發展遇阻礙？金正恩「認了」。中時電子報。https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20240630700403-430701
蔡珊伶（2024年1月26日）。金正恩罕見承認北韓「經濟困難」！提供地方生活必需品都成問題。NOWnews。https://www.nownews.com/news/6353649?srsltid=AfmBOop-AhcfK29pf6RKdRJ-MTnHfaJf3N0ighu0ygCeN_4omhWzuC27
蔡鵑如（2019年2月16日）。美總統擁有136項緊急權力。中時新聞網。https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20190216000541-260510?chdtv
錢亞平（2011年5月28日）。六十年來中國對外援助了多少。光明數字報。https://epaper.gmw.cn/wzb/html/2011-05/28/nw.D110000wzb_20110528_1-05.htm

機構團體資源
臺灣
全面禁止我與北韓之雙邊輸出入貿易（2017年9月22）。臺灣行政院。https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/4fe44064-f941-4aba-bd13-cc5d24a630ab
中國
中華人民共和國對外援助管理辦法（2021年8月27日）。中國國家國際發展合作署。https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-08/27/content_5728855.htm
中國外交部。https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zyxw/201009/t20100923_309786.shtml
中國國家國際發展合作署。http://www.cidca.gov.cn/index.htm
中國國家國際發展合作署的中國對外援助白皮書。http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/06/c_129925064_3.htm
中國國家國際發展合作署的《中國對外援助》白皮書（2021年8月6日）。國家國際發展合作署。http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/06/c_129925064_3.htm
中國宣導和平共處五項原則。中國外交部。https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/200011/t20001107_7950050.shtml.
陳揚勇（2012年7月12日）。江澤民“走出去”戰略的形成及其重要意義。中共中央黨史和文獻研究院。https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/BIG5/n1/2019/0228/c425426-30909751.html.
羅建波、孔志國（2022年12月13日）。對外援助八項原則的提出。中華人民共和國國史網。
關於《對外援助管理辦法》的政策解讀（2021年8月31日）。國家國際發展合作署。http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2021-08/31/c_1211351316.htm.

美國
Byrne. J. J. (2017). 銀行與《美國愛國法》。美國在臺協會。https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/E-JOURNAL/EJ_TerroristFin/byrne-2.htm
H.R.2670 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. (2023). US Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text.
H.R.3884 - National Emergencies Act. (1976). US Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/94th-congress/house-bill/3884
北韓制裁案指南（2018-2022）。美國財政部外國資產管控辦公室（OFAC）。https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions.
美國政府公告制裁。https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information
美國財政部外國資產管控辦公室（OFAC）。https://ofac.treasury.gov/
美國商務部工業安全辦公室。https://www.bis.gov/.
美國綜合篩選清單（the Consolidated Sanctions List）。https://www.trade.gov/data-visualization/csl-search.

國際組織
International Trad Centre. https://www.intracen.org/.
世界貿易組織(WTO)。http://data.wto.org/.
經濟合作暨發展組織（OECD）。https://data-explorer.oecd.org/
聯合國安理會公告制裁委員會。https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information.
聯合國制裁北韓1718號決議案。聯合國https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718.
聯合國貿易和發展會議。https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/.

民間團體
AidData. https://www.aiddata.org/
Funding the United Nations: How Much Does the U.S. Pay? (2025, Feb. 28). Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs
白話美國進出口合規制裁黑名單（2021年7月23日）。浩天律師事務所。https://www.hylandslaw.com/content/details18_2056.html
朱翊萱（2019）。美國《國際緊急經濟權力法》（IEEPA），資策會科技法律研究所。https://stli.iii.org.tw/article-detail.aspx?no=65&tp=1&d=8304
許峻賓（2023）。美中貿易戰五週年：全球貿易變化。中華民國全國商業總會工商會務，138。https://www.roccoc.org.tw/web/publications/publications_in2.jsp?cp_id=CP1697096187103