本研究旨在探討加盟公司公開文件之變更與財務資訊之關聯，分析在美國加盟公司公開申報FDD中Item20近三年店家數的揭露重述(修正)情形、Item19財務績效表現揭露程度與類別變更情形、上市母公司簽證會計師事務所、經理人與股票選擇權連結之酬勞比重等因素與資訊不對稱之關聯。
另外，本研究發現入選Entrepreneur's Franchise 500 List之公司所揭露的加盟直營店家數與官方FDD所呈現之數據仍有差異，且於500 List高估之樣本過往發生Item 19、Item 20改變與修正的比例較高，可見約束力較FDD小的500 List具有廣告性質，其針對修正頻繁之加盟企業給予較有利的資訊，因此本研究呼籲資訊使用者須謹慎評估資訊的真實性，並多方參考其他約束力較足夠的文件例如年報，再進行後續的投資行為。
本研究並針對美國FTC於2007 年修法後發佈並公告之FDD進行分析加盟資訊改變與修正對上市加盟企業買賣價差的影響，研究結果顯示加盟資訊改變與修正並未顯著影響公司在市場上的股票買賣價差，但其經理人股票及選擇權酬勞佔總酬勞的比重卻顯著與買賣價差呈現負相關。

This study investigates the association between revision of franchise disclosure document and financial information. We examine the relationship between the revision of the number of past 3 year outlets in Item 20、the extent of disclosure and the change of types in Item 19、CPA firm of listed parent company and the ratio of stock option-based managerial compensation and information asymmetry proxy, bid-ask spreads of listed franchised firms.
We find that the number of franchised and company owned outlets provided by Entrepreneur's Franchise 500 List are different from the information provided in official FDD. Moreover, we find that franchise companies tend to overestimate the number of outlets and have higher proportion of revisions in Items 19 and 20. It can be seen that the Entrepreneur's Franchise 500 list, which is less binding than FDD, has an advertising effects which may help frequent revised companies provide more favorable information to solicit franchisees. Therefore, this study calls for information users to be cautious in assessing the authenticity of information and compare it with more binding document like annual report before investment in franchised opportunities.
We retrieve information from FDD amended in 2007 required by the FTC and analyzes the impact of the revisions of the franchise information on the bid-ask spread of listed franchise firms. The empirical results show that the relationship between the revision on FDD and bid ask spread is insignificant and the relationship between the ratio of stock option-based managerial compensation and the bid-ask spread is significant.

一、 中文部分
魏筠潔(民106年)，影響加盟業主揭露財務資訊多寡因素之探討—以美國連鎖餐飲食品業為例，國立政治大學財務管理學研究所碩士論文，2017年6月。
陳明輝(民98年)，企業社會責任與財務報表品質之關聯性分析—以財報重編為例，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文，2009年6月。
王佑生(民94年)，自願性財務預測制度與資訊揭露，國立政治大學經營管理學系碩士論文，2005年6月。

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