本研究主要探討政治獻金對於併購事件宣告的股價累積異常報酬率與併購後會計績效之影響。研究對象為我國上市及上櫃主併公司，樣本期間為2004年至2016年，運用事件研究法與複迴歸分析法加以分析。實證結果顯示，股票市場投資人對於主併方及被併方是否曾捐贈政治獻金，無顯著反應；然而，主併方曾捐贈政治獻金對於併購後第1至2年會計績效，則呈正向顯著關係。本研究結果發現主併方藉由捐贈政治獻金建立政治連結，能為併購活動帶來正向影響。

This study examines the association between political contributions and mergers and acquisitions（M&A）. Specifically, we focus on market actions during the announcement period of M&A and post-M&A performance. Using a sample of Taiwanese firms engaged in M&A activities from 2004 to 2016, we find that there is no relation between political contributions and abnormal stock returns during M&A announcement periods. However, we find that acquires that make political contributions exhibit superior accounting performance in the post-M&A period than acquirers that do not make political contributions. Our findings suggest that acquires establishing political connections through political contributions have positive influence on M&A activities.

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