先前文獻指出，管理階層盈餘預測相當程度代表企業之揭露品質，且先前文獻亦指出高階經理人之個人特質會影響其思維與決策判斷。本研究以管理階層盈餘預測之「準確度」與「修正次數」作為盈餘預測揭露之指標，另以「十二星座」作為影響經理人個人特質之指標，探討管理階層盈餘預測是否受高階經理人之個人特質影響。
本研究將管理階層盈餘預測細分為：對營業收入之預測、對經常性利益之預測與對淨利之預測。實證結果顯示，當最高階經理人星座為摩羯座時，對營業收入之預測的準確度較高；為雙魚座時，對經常性利益之預測的準確度較低；為巨蟹座時，對淨利之預測的準確度較高；其餘星座對管理階層盈餘預測之準確度皆無顯著影響。本研究實證結果進一步顯示，最高階經理人星座與管理階層盈餘預測修正次數之間皆無顯著關聯。

Prior researches suggest that management earnings forecasts significantly represent the quality of corporate disclosures. Prior researches also suggest that personal characteristics of corporate managers may influence their thinking and decision-making. This paper uses the "accuracy" and "frequency of revisions" of management earnings forecasts as the measures of earnings forecast disclosure and uses the "zodiac" as the measure for personal characteristics of managers to explore whether management earnings forecasts are influenced by the personal characteristics of top manager.
This paper uses management earnings forecasts for sales revenue, ordinary profit, and net income. The empirical results show that when the zodiac sign of the top manager is Capricorn, the accuracy of sales revenue forecasts is higher. On the other hand, managers with a Pisces zodiac have lower forecast accuracy for ordinary profit. Also, a manager who has a Cancer of zodiac will have higher forecast accuracy for net income. The results show no association between other zodiacs signs and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. At last, this study finds no significant association between the zodiac signs and the frequency of revisions to management earnings forecasts.

1111人力銀行，2017，企業人資不告訴你的秘密，網址：
https://www.1111.com.tw/news/jobns/103663，搜尋日期：2024年5月15日。
中華徵信所，1993，台灣地區專業經理人名錄，臺北：著者。
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