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研究生: 馬宇霖
Ma, Yu-Lin
論文名稱: 拜登時期的美中科技戰對台灣半導體產業的影響:新現實主義視角分析
The Impact of the U.S.-China Tech War during the Biden Administration on Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry: Perspective from Neorealism
指導教授: 袁力強
Yuan, Li-Chung
口試委員: 姚宏旻
Yau, Hon-Min
甯方璽
Ning, Fang-Shii
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 社會科學學院 - 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS)
International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies(IMAS)
論文出版年: 2024
畢業學年度: 112
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 237
中文關鍵詞: 新現實主義美中科技戰台灣半導體產業
外文關鍵詞: Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry, Neorealism, The US-China Tech War
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  • 新現實主義是國際關係理論中最具影響力的理論之一,為分析國家在無政府狀態的全球體系中的行為提供了一個引人注目的視角。本研究運用新現實主義框架來探討美中科技競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響,特別關注從拜登總統上任至今的發展。根據Kenneth Waltz所闡述的新現實主義,國家將生存置於考量,在一個以權力動態和安全考量為主的環境中謹慎行動。

    本研究採用質性研究方法,共分為六個章節:從研究簡介開始,接著是新現實主義的理論,其次深入探討美中科技競爭的本質,然後分析拜登政府期間美中之間的技術競爭,接著檢視這一競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響,最後總結研究發現並提出結論。本研究的主要目的是透過新現實主義,來解析美國、中國與台灣之間複雜的三邊關係。

    研究結果顯示,處於日益激烈的美中科技競爭核心的台灣半導體產業,已經做出了戰略性的回應,例如在美國鳳凰城、日本熊本和德國得勒斯登建立生產設施,同時推進其國內技術能力的發展,例如投資於2/3奈米製程技術的開發。這種雙重策略確保了台灣在全球供應鏈中的關鍵角色不受影響。此外,本研究還指出,隨著台灣半導體產業繼續支撐美國的軍事和技術優勢,美國保衛台灣抵禦中國壓力的決心可能會相應增強。因此,台灣必須在全球半導體供應鏈中保持不可或缺的地位,這或許是台灣在這場競爭中不得不選擇的一條路徑。


    Neorealism is one of the most influential theories in the field of international relations, offering a compelling lens through which to analyze the behavior of states in an anarchic global system. This study employs a neorealist framework to examine the impact of U.S.-China technological competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on developments since the inauguration of President Biden. According to Kenneth Waltz's articulation of neorealism, states prioritize survival and act cautiously in an environment dominated by power dynamics and security concerns.

    This research adopts a qualitative methodology and is divided into six chapters. It begins with an introduction, followed by a theoretical discussion of neorealism. The subsequent chapters delve into the nature of U.S.-China technological competition, analyze the technological rivalry between the two powers during the Biden administration, and then assess the impact of this competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. The final chapter summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions. The primary aim of this study is to decode the complex triangular relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan through the lens of neorealism.

    The findings indicate that Taiwan's semiconductor industry, at the epicenter of intensifying U.S.-China technological competition, has strategically responded by establishing production facilities in Phoenix, Arizona; Kumamoto, Japan; and Dresden, Germany, while simultaneously advancing domestic technological capabilities, such as investing in the development of 2/3 nanometer process technologies. This dual strategy ensures that Taiwan's critical role in the global supply chain remains unchallenged. Furthermore, the study suggests that as Taiwan’s semiconductor industry continues to bolster the United States' military and technological superiority, Washington's resolve to defend Taiwan against Chinese coercion may strengthen accordingly. Thus, maintaining an indispensable position in the global semiconductor supply chain might be the path Taiwan must choose in this competition.

    Title Page i
    Abstract ii
    摘要 iii
    Table of Contents iv
    List of Figures vii
    CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
    1.1. Background 1
    1.2. Research Questions 4
    1.3. Literature Review 5
    1.3.1. U.S.-China War 5
    1.3.2. U.S.-China Tech War 9
    1.3.3. Tech War’s Impacts on Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry and its
    Response 15
    1.4. Theoretical Framework 20
    1.5. Research Objectives and Contribution 21
    1.6. Research Methods 21
    1.7. Thesis Arrangement 23
    CHAPTER 2 NEOREALISM 24
    2.1. Introduction to Neorealism 24
    2.2. The Evolution of Neorealism 25
    2.3. Core Assumptions of Neorealism 27
    2.4. Neorealism and the U.S.-China Tech War 30
    2.5. Taiwan's Strategic Position in the U.S.-China Tech War 34
    CHAPTER 3 THE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY 38
    3.1. The Five Factors 38
    3.1.1. Ideological Smackdown 38
    3.1.2. Bumping Heads for the Nation's Sake 39
    3.1.3. Global Tug-of-War 43
    3.1.4. Battle for the Top Spot 45
    3.1.5. Mind the Gap 46
    3.2. From the Trade War to the Tech War 56
    CHAPTER 4 THE U.S.-CHINA TECH WAR DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION 79
    4.1. Sticking to the Tough Talk 79
    4.2. Chips on the Line 82
    4.3. Keeping the Lines Open 113
    4.3.1. Face-off at the Summit (2021, November 15) 113
    4.3.2. Biden and Xi in Bali (2022, November 14) 115
    4.3.3. Redefining U.S.-China Diplomacy (2023, June 18-19) 117
    4.3.4. Yellen’s Beijing Balle (2023, June 6-9) 123
    4.3.5. Raimondo’s China Tango (2023, August 27-30) 126
    4.3.6. When Biden and Xi Tried to Break the Ice in San Francisco 128
    4.3.7. The Call that Rocked the Lines (2024, April 2) 130
    4.3.8. When Yellen Took on Beijing (2024, April 4-9) 131
    4.3.9. When Blinken Walked the Dragon’s Den (2024, April 24-26) 133
    4.4. Tech Tug-of-War 135
    4.4.1. America’s Race to Stay Ahead in Innovation 135
    4.4.2. Tech Growth's Uphill Battle in the U.S 141
    4.4.3. China’s Tech Revolution 149
    4.5 The Long Haul 164
    CHAPTER 5 THE IMPACTOF THE US-CHINA TECH WAR ON TAIWAN’S SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 166
    5.1. Stuck in a Rock and a Hard Place 166
    5.2. The Silicon Shield 169
    5.2.1. Gradual Withdrawal from the Chinese Market 170
    5.2.2. Increasing Investment in Neighboring Asian Countries 171
    5.2.3. TSMC’s Investment in Japan, the U.S., and Germany 180
    5.2.4. Taiwan’s CHIPS Act 180
    5.3. Taiwan's Got to Be the One and Only 181
    CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 183
    6.1. Conclusion 183
    6.2. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Suggestion 184
    Bibliography 186
    Appendix 1. Hsinchu Science Park and TSMC Confront the Challenge from South Korea's Semiconductor Industry 207
    Appendix 2. U.S.-China Cyber Warfare. 209
    Appendix 3. TARIFFS HURT the HEARTLAND 210
    Appendix 4. Ren Zhengfei's Interview with New York Times Op-Ed Columnist Thomas L. Friedman 211
    Appendix 5. Taiwanese Rep. to the U.S. Bi-khim Hsiao on "Face the Nation," Aug. 7, 2022 219
    Appendix 6. The Crisis and Opportunity from “Decoupling” to “De-risking” 224
    Appendix 7. The Ban on TikTok 229
    Appendix 8. The 2024 Trump Presidential Campaign and Cross-Strait Relations 232
    Appendix 9. The Six Five: Huawei To Introduce A Chip In Chinese Market To Compete With NVIDIA? 234
    Appendix 10. Alternative Supply Chains to Decoupling from China 237
    List of Figures
    Figure 1: The Belt and Road Initiative Has Gone Global: Official BRI participants by year of joining 33
    Figure 2. Proportion of Consumer Goods Subject to U.S. Tariffs on China 60
    Figure 3. The Complexity of the U.S. Semiconductor Supply Chain 85
    Figure 4. Semiconductor Manufacturers, Construction and Equipment Costs 96
    Figure 5:US Manufacturing Employment between 2002 and 2022 140
    Figure 6: The Companies that Benefited from the CHIPS Act 143
    Figure 7: U.S. Employment in Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing from January 2019 to January 2024 146
    Figure 8: 2018-2023 Huawei Revenue and Revenue Growth Rate 151
    Figure 9: Tesla Global Deliveries vs BYD Passenger BEV Sales 155
    Figure 10: China’s Role in the EV Car Value Chain 159
    Figure 11: Intel Withdraws from DRAM Business 176

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