| 研究生: |
林佩瑜 Lin, Pei-Yu |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
中國天災風險與管理能力對於財務報表舞弊之影響 The Impact of Natural Disaster Risk and Management Capability on Financial Statement Fraud in China |
| 指導教授: | 金成隆 |
| 口試委員: |
梁嘉紋
劉佩怡 |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
商學院 - 會計學系 Department of Accounting |
| 論文出版年: | 2026 |
| 畢業學年度: | 114 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 33 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 天災風險 、財務報表舞弊 、管理者能力 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Natural disaster, Fraudulent financial reporting, Managerial ability |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:16 下載:0 |
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隨著氣候變遷加劇與國際永續準則IFRS S2的發布,極端氣候對企業財務報導品質的衝擊已成為產官學界關注的焦點。本研究旨在探討當企業面臨天災衝擊此一外部不確定性時,管理者能力是否仍能維持其對財務報表舞弊的抑制效果,並進一步剖析公司治理結構在災後情境下的調節角色。本研究以2007年至2023年中國上市企業為樣本,結合其企業財務報表舞弊紀錄與天災資料探討其中關連性。實證結果顯示,在經歷天災後,未發現證據支持管理者能力仍能有效抑制舞弊行為,進一步針對經歷天災之企業進行橫斷面分析發現,管理者能力的治理效果高度依賴特定的公司治理結構。實證顯示,在受災企業中,唯有在董事長兼任總經理或存在大股東的治理情境下,管理者能力才能顯著抑制舞。此結果支持了權變理論與監督假說:在災後高度不確定的環境下,權力集中有助於提升高能力管理者的決策效率以應對危機,而大股東的強效監督則能確保其專業能力用於解決實質問題而非財報操弄。本研究將天災風險納入舞弊分析架構,證實了管理者能力與治理結構在應對外部極端衝擊時的互補,研究結論有助於監管機構與投資人在 IFRS S2架構下,更精確地評估企業的氣候韌性與財務報導品質 。
As climate change intensifies and International sustainability Standards Board releases IFRS S2, the impact of extreme climate events on the quality of corporate financial reporting has become a focal concern for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars. This study examines whether managerial ability continues to deter financial statement fraud when firms face natural disaster shocks, and whether corporate governance structures condition this effect. Using Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2023 and combining fraud records with disaster data, we find no evidence that managerial ability alone constrains fraud after disasters. However, among disaster-affected firms, managerial ability significantly reduces fraud only under specific governance arrangements—namely CEO duality or the presence of large shareholders. These results support contingency theory and the monitoring hypothesis, suggesting that concentrated authority enhances decision efficiency in crisis settings, while strong shareholder monitoring ensures managerial expertise is applied to substantive problem-solving rather than financial manipulation. Overall, the findings highlight the complementary roles of managerial ability and governance structures in mitigating fraud under extreme climaterelated uncertainty, with implications for assessing firms’ climate resilience and reporting quality within the IFRS S2 framework.
壹、 緒論 1
貳、 文獻探討與假說 4
一、 天然災害風險與財務報表舞弊 4
二、 管理者能力與財務報表舞弊之關聯性 5
三、 治理結構對經營績效的影響 7
四、 假說建立 7
參、 研究方法 10
一、 資料來源與樣本篩選過程 10
二、 天災風險及管理者能力對於財務報表舞弊 11
三、 管理者能力衡量 11
四、 經歷天災後管理者能力與治理結構對於財務報表舞弊之影響 12
肆、 實證結果 15
一、敘述性統計 15
二、 相關係數矩陣 16
三、 管理者能力與財務報表舞弊之相關性19
四、經歷天災後公司治理機制下管理者能力對於財務報表舞弊之影響 21
伍、額外分析 23
陸、結論 26
一、 主要研究發現 26
二、 研究限制與未來展望 27
附錄1 變數定義 29
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全文公開日期 2031/02/04