本研究為探討網路演化過程中的群聚現象，說明網路是否能夠藉由訊息傳遞的過程而浮現出族群分離的現象，為此我們架構了一個電腦模型，同時加入了突現行為（mutation）的考量，藉此來瞭解網路形成過程中的不理性行為是否有影響族群群聚的功效存在，探討在不同的突現發生機率下，網路演化過程中的群聚現象是否會隨著突現發生機率的不同而產生不同的結果。至於，在連結形成方面，我們設定連結如果要形成的話，必須要雙方玩家都願意採取相同的投資動作才能成立，連結必須要雙方玩家都相互協調的情況下才能建立，所以玩家每期都會先選擇要進行的投資策略，其次才依照雙方所選擇的投資動作來決定連結是否建立，並不像以往的文獻中所述，完全依照玩家是否有連結誘因存在來決定連結是否建立，在本研究中玩家是依照雙方所選擇的投資動作來決定連結是否形成。

在此研究中，我們以富人和窮人的投資合作過程為故事背景，假定玩家都有兩種投資策略可以選擇，玩家會從中擇一採用，當雙方玩家協商之後，如果雙方都願意採取相同的投資動作的話，則連結就會建立。設定富人選擇投資策略的自由度較高，而窮人選擇投資策略的自由度較低，因此當玩家開始去尋找適合的合作伙伴時，窮人所受的限制較多，而富人所受的限制較少，但是為了避免設定了太強的假設，所以本研究盡量使用較為薄弱的假設，盡可能使窮人與富人之間的差異性不大且符合現實。在這種行為模式的設定下，我們利用兩個群聚比例來計算每期所形成的同性質連結數目，藉由這兩個群聚比例的變化來探究網路形成過程中的群聚分離狀況，因此我們利用了一個較為間接的方式來瞭解所要討論的議題。

本研究透過演算模擬得到幾個結論：（1）平均群聚比例會隨著突現發生機率趨於0而不斷提升，代表網路隨著突現發生機率的下滑，族群分離的程度會隨之趨於明顯。（2）當突現發生機率很低時，平均群聚比例會隨著玩家每期能夠建立的最大連結數目增加而下滑，網路內的族群分離現象逐漸不明顯。但是當突現發生機率很高時，卻會維持在平均的水準。（3）當玩家的人數增多時，突現的發生對群聚比例會有提升的效果存在，不管最大連結數目為何都會有如此的結果。（4）如果市場上處於一個貧富人數不均的環境下，則隨著網路的演化最後所計算出來的族群現象就會越明顯，富人自然會和富人相連，而窮人自然會和窮人相連，群聚現象是自然演變出來的。（5）若搜尋時採隨機模式，則平均群聚比例在突現發生機率很高時會較一般模式差，而在突現發生機率很低時則與一般模式差異不大。（6）若突現僅限於連結的斷裂，且窮人的動作選擇僅限於投資策略二，則平均群聚比例則會趨近於一。

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