本研究旨在探討共同基金同儕壓力是否會對基金經理人的撤換產生影響。本研究以基金家族內是否有明星基金作為衡量同儕壓力的主要變數，並輔以基金家族內是否有其他相同投資類型之明星基金、基金家族內是否有多個其他相同投資類型之基金另外兩個變數作為衡量同儕壓力之因子。實證研究結果發現，共同基金同儕壓力顯著對基金經理人撤換機率產生正向影響。當基金經理人面臨較高的同儕壓力時，其被撤換的機率亦會較高。本研究亦發現同儕壓力會增加基金績效和基金經理人撤換間的負向關係，表示當基金經理人面臨較高的同儕壓力而其管理的基金又績效不佳時，該基金經理人將有較高的機率被撤換。本研究將基金經理人的撤換分為部分撤換與完全撤換兩種形式，進而利用多元羅吉斯回歸探討同儕壓力與其他控制變數對基金經理人撤換機率的影響。實證結果發現，無論是哪種撤換類型，當基金經理人面臨較高的同儕壓力時，其被撤換的機率亦會較高。本研究亦發現同儕壓力會增加基金流和基金經理人間的負向關係，表示當基金經理人面臨較高的同儕壓力而其管理的基金面臨資金流出時，該基金經理人將有較高的機率被撤換，此結果僅出現在基金經理人部分撤換類型的決定中。

This study explores the effect of peer pressure within the mutual fund family on mutual fund manager turnover. Specifically, this study introduces three measures to evaluate the peer competition of a fund, the existence of a star fund in the same fund family as the fund, the existence of a star fund at the objective level in the same fund family as the fund, and the existence of affiliated funds with the same objective as the fund. Empirical results show that peer pressure has a significant impact on the probability of mutual fund manager turnover. This indicates that a fund manager is more likely to be replaced if the fund manager suffers a higher peer pressure. In addition, this study finds that peer pressure can enhance the negative relationship between fund manager turnover and fund performance, indicating that a fund manager is more likely to be replaced if he/she experiences a poor performance under the higher peer pressure condition. To examine the impact of peer pressure on different decisions of fund manager replacement, this study further separates the sample of fund manager turnover into partial replacement and all replacement. Results from the multinomial logistic regression show that a fund manager is more likely to be replaced if the fund manager suffers a higher peer pressure, either of which turnover types. Besides, the results also show weak evidence that peer pressure can enhance the negative relationship between fund manager turnover and fund flow, indicating that a fund manager is more likely to be replaced if the fund experiences outflow under the higher peer pressure condition.

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