In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

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Chinese:

王文宇，「建構我國金融控股公司法制相關問題之研究」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.33-54.

沈中華、吳孟紋，「銀行治理、銀行失敗與銀行績效：以台灣為例」，亞太論文管理叢刊，2003。

沈中華、吳孟紋、陳錦村，「更早期預警模型：台灣銀行道德指標的建立及影響」，管理學報二審。

李紀珠， ‘台灣開放民營銀行設立之經驗與展望’， 「台灣民營銀行發展經驗教訓及對大陸的啟示」國際學術研討會，91年12月13日.

李桐豪，「由美國金融服務業現代化法看我國的金融控股公司法」，台灣金融財務季刊，第二輯第二期，90年6月，pp.1-18.

陳駿逸、劉佩修、張慧雯、彭禎伶、邵朝賢，台灣金控大火併，商訊文化，2003.

彭金龍，「論我國金融控股公司之投資與被投資事業管理」，台灣金融財務季刊，第四輯第一期，92年3月，pp.163-183.

許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩、鄭桂蕙，「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量」，貨幣觀測與信用評等，42,43，2003.

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Website:

SinoPac Holdings website: www.sinopac.com.tw

Market Observation Post System: mops.tse.com.tw

Taiwan Economics Journal database

The Legislative Yuan website:www.ly.gov.tw