我國偵查中之羈押處分還需由法官審查決定，由於法官須於短時間內審查決定是否羈押被告，因此備感壓力及困難，若處置有所失當便易引起輿論。本文以賽局中序列均衡的方法，藉由檢察官與法官對嫌疑犯罪刑輕重了解程度不同的資訊不對稱模型，探討若檢察官可以聲請羈押，並考慮法官駁回羈押聲請及社會大眾對檢察官之評量下之羈押賽局均衡結果。我們發現無論法官是否可以駁回檢察官羈押之聲請，嫌疑重大之嫌疑犯皆將會被羈押且判罪，而無辜的嫌疑犯則能獲得澄清；又若考慮社會大眾對檢方之評量，便會增加許多均衡策略的可能情況，但可以確定的是，檢察官聲請羈押的權利能帶給法官裁決的依據，並且當檢察官聲請羈押時法官便會判此嫌疑犯有罪。

In Taiwan, the judge has to examine the detention of investigation in the short time. If he makes improper decisions, the criticism will arise. Therefore the judge often endures the enormous pressure when he makes decisions. We explore a model of detention with asymmetric information in which the understanding to the defendant is different between the prosecutor and the judge. The sequential equilibrium (SE) method of the game theory is used to analyze the situation that the prosecutor can request the detention, the judge can reject the request, and the public can criticize the prosecutor’s behavior. We find that whether the judge can reject the request or not, the guilty will be detained and convicted while the innocent will be clarified. Moreover, considering the criticism at the same time, there will be many possible SE. The conclusion is that the conviction decision made by the judge will depend on the prosecutor’s detention right. It means that when the prosecutor requests the detention and the defendant will be convicted.

林山田、林東茂、林燦璋（2002），「犯罪學」，三民書局。

林俊益（2003），「刑事訴訟法概論（上）」，學林文化事業有限公司。

陳榮傳（2005），「2005台灣司法人權指標調查報告」，社團法人中國人權協會。

張麗卿（2003），「刑事訴訟法理論與應用」，五南文化事業。

蔡墩銘（1999），「刑事訴訟法概要」，三民書局。

Alshuler, A. (1979), “Plea Bargaining and Its History ,” Law and Society Review, 13,
210-231.

Baker, S. and C. Mezzetti (2001), “Prosecutorial Resource, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 17, 149-167.

Forst, B. and K. B. Brosi (1977), “A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor,” Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 177-91.

Grossman, G. M. and M. L. Katz (1983), “Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare,” American Economic Review, 73, 749-57.

Huber, G. A. and S. C. Gordon (2002), “Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives
of Criminal Prosecutors,” American Journal of Political Science, 46, 334-351.

Huber, G. A. and S. C. Gordon (2004), “Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?,” American Journal of Political Science, 48, 247-263.

Kobayashi, B. H. (1992), “Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: an Explanation For
‘Unfair’ Plea Bargains Welfare,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23, 507-517.

Kobayashi, B. H. and J. Lott (1996), “In Defense of Criminal Expenditures and
Plea Bargaining,” International Review of Law and Economics, 16, 397–415.

Kreps, D. M. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.

Landes, W. M. (1971), “An Economic Analysis of the Courts,” Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 61-107.

Lemert, E. (1967), Human Deviance, Social Problem, and Social Control.

Miceli, T. J. (1990), “Optimal prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt is Uncertain,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, 189-201.

Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press.

Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press.

Reinganum, J. F. (1988), “Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion,” American Economic Review, 78, 713-728.

Rhodes, W. M. (1976), “The Economics of Criminal Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Legal Studies, 5, 311-40.

Spence, A. M. (1974), “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-374.

Walker, S. (1985), Sense and Nonsense About Crime. Monterey: Brooks/Cole.

Weimer, D. L. (1978), “Plea Bargaining and the Decision to go to Trial: The Application of a Rational Choice Model,” Policy Sciences, 10, 1-24.