本文以Tiebout（1956）及Zodrow與Mieszkowski（1986）為基礎，利用地方政府間之租稅競爭行為，結合租稅負擔與支出性質，探討地方公共財最適提供條件與資本稅歸宿條件。
　租稅競爭行為通常只以課徵資本稅作為分析對象，但資本稅因存在扭曲性質，故政府提供之公共財數量必然低於最適水準。而本文引入政府提供不同類型公共財搭配課徵資本稅之觀點，利用要素彈性解釋地方公共財最適提供條件。本文發現在基本模型（僅考慮資本要素）中，消費性公共財提供數量會低於最適水準，生產性公共財則可能為提供不足或過度提供，主要原因取決於生產性公共財對生產動力之影響是否足以彌補資本稅帶來之扭曲性，而在延伸模型（同時考慮資本及勞動要素）中，消費性及生產性公共財雖仍提供不足，但消費性公共財較基本模型接近最適數量，而生產性公共財則較遠離最適數量。
　　由於廠商及居民在租稅制度之機制下皆有可能承擔稅負，新觀點之歸宿理論認為課徵單一資本稅因不存在替代效果，故稅負全部由資本所有者承擔，而本文則以政府提供不同類型公共財之觀點，分析資本稅競爭環境之最後稅負承擔者，本文發現地方政府間租稅競爭行為會使資本稅發生轉嫁現象，且稅負由資本所有者及使用者共同承擔。
當政府可透過支出政策，藉由提供吸引消費者遷入之消費性公共財或增加廠商生產動力之生產性公共財時，本文認為因公共支出成本係由使用之居民或廠商負擔，故資本稅具有使用者付費之受益性質。另本文發現在均衡時，於同轄區內定居之消費者及投資之廠商對政府公共支出品質與稅負具有相同偏好，此係政府、廠商與消費者運用自我選擇機制而使彼此間行為產生相互配合之現象，因而可滿足Tiebout模型強調之區分機制。

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