跳到主要內容

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 杜業榮
Ye-Rong Du
論文名稱: 認知能力與認知階層 : 選美賽局的實驗分析
Cognitive Capacity and Cognitive Hierarchy: Experimental Evidence from Keynes's Beauty Contest
指導教授: 陳樹衡
Shu-Heng Chen
學位類別: 博士
Doctor
系所名稱: 社會科學學院 - 經濟學系
Department of Economics
論文出版年: 2013
畢業學年度: 101
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 86
中文關鍵詞: 選美賽局智力工作記憶k層次思考認知階層強化學習信念學習經驗加權吸引力學習
外文關鍵詞: Beauty contest experiment, Intelligence, Working memory capacity, Level-k reasoning, Cognitive hierarchies, Reinforcement learning, Belief learning, Experience-weighted attraction learning
相關次數: 點閱:337下載:96
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • 晚近行為實驗的發展, 特別是在賽局實驗的研究中, 認知所扮演的角色漸受重視。認知階層與認知能力, 是文獻上兩個相關並且廣被討論的概念。 雖然這兩者往往出現在同樣的實驗中, 但仍少有研究正式地探討兩者之間的關係。 在本研究中, 我們透過15至20人為一組的重複選美賽局觀察受試者的認知階層, 並以工作記憶測驗測量其認知能力, 試圖檢驗認知能力對於認知階層的影響。 總的來說, 我們發現認知能力對於認知階層有正向的影響, 即認知能力較高的受試者, 所觀察到的認知階層也較高。 在最初幾個回合中, 認知能力的影響顯著。 接下來的回合中雖然效果漸弱, 但並不會完全消失。 這意謂著認知能力可能進一步影響其學習行為, 因此透過認知階層的馬可夫轉移動態與經驗加權吸引力學習模型, 我們檢驗此一可能性。 證據顯示認知能力不同反映學習行為的差異, 尤其相較於強化學習, 認知能力較高的受試者可能更傾向信念學習。


    Recent developments in behavioral experiments, in particular game experiments, have placed human cognition in a pivotal place. Two related ideas are proposed and are popularly used in the literature, namely, cognitive hierarchy and cognitive capacity. While these two often meet in the same set of experiments and observations, few studies have formally addressed their relationship. In this study, based on six series of 15- to 20-person beauty contest experiments and the associated working memory tests, we examine the effect of cognitive capacity on the observed cognitive hierarchy. It is found that cognitive capacity has a positive effect on the observed cognitive hierarchy. This effect is strong in the initial rounds, and may become weaker, but without disappearing, in subsequent rounds, which suggests the possibility that cognitive capacity may further impact learning. We examine this possibility using the Markov transition dynamics of cognitive hierarchy and experience-weighted attraction learning. There is evidence to show that subjects with different cognitive capacities may learn differently, which may cause strong convergence to be difficult to observe.

    Contents
    1 Introduction 9
    1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    1.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    2 Literature Review 13
    2.1 BCG and Cognitive Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
    2.2 BCG and Cognitive Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    2.3 Cognitive Capacity and Cognitive Hierarchy . . . . 17
    2.4 Cognitive Capacity and Learning . . . . . . . . . . 19
    2.4.1 Cognitive Capacity, Cognitive Hierarchy and
    Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    2.4.2 Cognitive Capacity and EWA Learning . . . . . 20
    2.5 A Summary of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
    3 Method 24
    3.1 Beauty Contest Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    3.2 Working Memory Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
    3.3 Cognitive Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    3.4 EWA Learning Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
    3.4.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
    3.4.2 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    4 Results 33
    4.1 WMC and Guessing Performance . . . . . . . . . . . 33
    4.2 WMC and Cognitive Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
    4.2.1 Static Analysis: Conditional Distribution and
    Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
    4.2.2 Dynamic Analysis: Evolution of Distributions 43
    4.2.3 Dynamic Analysis: Markov Transition Matrix . 46
    4.3 Guessing Performances and Cognitive Hierarchy . . . 51
    4.4 WMC and EWA Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
    4.4.1 Camerer's EWA Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 53
    4.4.2 EWA Rule Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
    5 Discussion and Conclusions 64

    A Instructions of BCG 74
    B Instructions of WMC Task 76
    C Level-k Distribution Conditional on WMC Percentiles: Pe-
    riod 3 to 10 82

    List of Figures
    1.1 An Overview of the Research Backgrounds . . . . . . . 11
    3.1 Level classification procedure for guesses in period
    1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
    3.2 Reinforcement and the corresponding interval for winner
    and loser in beauty contest experiments . . . . . . . 30
    4.1 Guessing Errors between the High WMC groups and the Low
    WMC roups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
    4.2 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles . 39
    4.3 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
    4.4 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
    4.5 Markov Transition Matrix of the State Space of Reasoning
    Levels, Estimated Using the Pool of 10 Periods . . . .47
    4.6 Markov Transition Matrix of the State Space of Reasoning
    Levels, Estimated Using the Pool of the Initial 5
    Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
    4.7 Markov Transition Matrix of the State Space of Reasoning
    Levels, Estimated Using the Pool of the Last 5 Periods49
    4.8 Guess distribution and predicted guess distribution . 56
    4.9 Level distribution and predicted level distribution . 60

    B.1 Instruction for backward digit span task(Dspan) . . . 77
    B.2 Instruction for spatial short-term memory test(SSTM) 78
    B.3 Instruction for memory updating task(MU) . . . . . . 79
    B.4 Instruction for sentence-span task(SentSpan) . . . . 80
    B.5 Instruction for operation-span task(OpsSpan) . . . . 81
    C.1 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
    C.2 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
    C.3 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
    C.4 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
    C.5 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
    C.6 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
    C.7 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
    C.8 Level-k distribution conditional on WMC percentiles in
    period 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

    List of Tables
    2.1 Literature on the Effect of Cognitive Capacity on
    Strategic Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
    3.1 Summary of Estimated Learning Models . . . . . . . . 31
    4.1 Correlation coefficients between WMC scores and
    guessing differences in the beauty contest experiment34
    4.2 Level-k thinking and working memory capacity . . . . 41
    4.3 Do High and Low WMC subjects exhibit similar level/guess
    distributions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
    4.4 Target-d istribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
    4.5 Model Parameter Estimates of EWA Following Camerer and
    Ho (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
    4.6 Model Parameter Estimates of EWA Following Camerer, Ho
    and Chong (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
    4.7 Model Parameter Estimates of EWA Rule Learning: Model
    IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58
    4.8 Model Parameter Estimates of EWA Rule Learning: Model V
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
    4.9 LR Test for the Significance of Difference in Parameter
    Estimates: Model V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

    Agranovy M, Caplin A, Tergiman C (2011) The process of
    choice in guessing games. Mimeo. Caltech.
    Arad A, Rubinstein A (2010) Colonel Blotto’s top secret
    files: Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action.
    Working paper.
    Branas-Garza P, Garcia-Munoz T, Hernan-Gonzalez R (2012)
    Cognitive effort in the beauty contest game. Journal of
    Economic Behavior and Organization 83(2): 254-260.
    Branas-Garza P, Meloso D, Miller L (2012) Interactive and
    moral reasoning: A comparative study of response times.
    IGIER, Universita Bocconi, Working Paper Series No. 440.
    Brock W, Hommes C (1998) Heterogeneous beliefs and routes
    to chaos in a simple asset pricing model. Journal of
    Economic Dynamics and Control 22:1235-1274.
    Buhren C, Frank B, Nagel R (2012) A historical note on the
    beauty contest. Working paper.
    Burnham T C, Cesarini D, Johannesson M, Lichtenstein P, and
    Wallace B (2009). Higher cognitive ability is associated
    with lower entries in a p-beauty contest. Journal of
    Economic Behavior and Organization 72(1):171-175.
    Camerer C F (1997) Progress in behavioral game theory.
    Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:167-188.
    Camerer C, Ho T-H (1998) EWA Learning in Games: Probability
    Form, Heterogeneity, and Time Variation. Journal of
    Mathematical Psychology, 42:305-326.
    Camerer C, Ho T-H (1999) Experienced-weighted attraction
    learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67(4):827-874.
    Camerer C F, Ho T-H, Chong J-K (2002) Sophisticated EWA
    Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.
    Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1): 137-88.
    Camerer C F, Ho T-H, Chong J-K (2004) A cognitive hierarchy
    model of games. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 861-
    98.
    Cantor J, Engle R W (1993) Working-memory capacity as long-
    term memory activation: An individual-differences
    approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
    Memory, and Cognition 19:1101-1114.
    Casari M, Ham J, Kagel J (2007) Selection bias, demographic
    effects, and ability effects in common value auction
    experiments. American Economic Review 97(4):1278-1304.
    Chen S-H (2012) Varieties of agents in agent-based
    computational economics: A historical and an
    interdisciplinary perspective. Journal of Economic
    Dynamics and Control 36(1):1-25.
    Chen S-H, Gostoli U, Tai C-C, Shih K-C (2012) To whom and
    where the hill becomes difficult to climb: Effects of
    cognitive capacity and personality in experimental DA
    markets. Advances in Behavioral Finance and Economics,
    forthcoming.
    Chong J-K, Camerer C, Ho T-H (2005). Cognitive hierarchy: A
    limited thinking theory in games. In: Zwick R and
    Rapoport A (eds.) Experimental Business Research, Vol. 3,
    203-228. Springer.
    Conway A R A, Cowan N, Bunting M F, Therriault D J, Minkoff
    S R B (2002) A latent variable analysis of working memory
    capacity, short-term memory capacity, processing speed,
    and general fluid intelligence. Intelligence 30(2):163-
    184.
    Coricelli G, Nagel R (2009) Neural correlates of depth of
    strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex.
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
    United States of America 106(23):9163-9168.
    Costa-Gomes M A, Crawford V P (2006) Cognition and behavior
    in two-person guessing games: An experimental study.
    American Economic Review 96:1737-1768.
    Costa-Gomes M A, Crawford V P, Broseta B (2001) Cognition
    and behavior in normal form games: An experimental study.
    Econometrica 69:1193-1235.
    Cowan N (2008) What are the differences between long-term,
    and short-term, and working memory? In: Sossin W S,
    Lacaille J-C, Castellucci V F, Belleville S (eds.),
    Progress in brain research, Essence of memory, Vol.
    169, 323-338. Elsevier.
    Daily L Z, Lovett M C, Reder L M (2001) Modeling individual
    differences in working memory performance: A source
    activation account. Cognitive Sciences 25:315-353.
    DellaVigna S (2009) Psychology and economics: Evidence from
    the field. Journal of Economic Literature 47:315-72.
    Devetag G, Warglien M (2003) Games and phone numbers: Do
    short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?
    Journal of Economic Psychology 24:189-202.
    Duffy J, Nagel R (1997) On the robustness of behaviour in
    experimental 'Beauty Contest' games. The Economic Journal
    107(445):1684-1700.
    Earl P E (1990) Economics and psychology: A survey. The
    Economic Journal 100:718-755.
    Eckel C, Grossman P (2008a) Differences in the economic
    decisions of men and women: Experimental evidence. In:
    Plott C, Smith V. (eds.) Handbook of Experimental
    Economics Results, Vol. 1, Chapter 57, 509-519, Elsevier.
    Eckel C, Grossman P (2008b) Men, women and risk aversion:
    Experimental evidence. In: Plott C, Smith V (eds.),
    Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol. 1,
    Chapter 57, 1061-1073, Elsevier.
    Engle R W, Tuholski S W, Laughlin J E, Conway A R A (1999)
    Working memory, short-term memory, and general fluid
    intelligence: A latent-variable approach. Journal of
    Experimental Psychology: General 128:309-331.
    Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made
    economic experiments, Experimental Economics 10(2):171-
    178.
    Frederick S (2005) Cognitive reflection and decision
    making. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19:25-42.
    Frey B, Stutzer A (2007) (eds.) Economics and Psychology: A
    Promising New Cross-Discipline Field. MIT Press.
    Georganas S, Healy P J, Weber, R A (2010) On the
    Persistence of Strategic Sophistication. Unpublished Ohio
    State working paper.
    Gill D, Prowse V (2012) Cognitive ability and learning to
    play equilibrium: A level-k analysis. Mimeo.
    Goldstein D, Gigerenzer G (2002) Models of ecological
    rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological
    Review 109:75-90.
    Grosskopf B, Nagel R (2008) The two-person beauty contest.
    Games and Economic Behavior 62:93-99.
    Guth W, Kocher M, Sutter M (2002) Experimental 'beauty
    contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and
    with interior and boundary equilibria. Economics Letters
    74:219-228.
    Hambrick D Z, Engle R W (2002) Effects of domain knowledge,
    working memory capacity, and age on cognitive
    performance: An investigation of the knowledge-is-power
    hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology 44:339-387.
    Herrnstein J R (1970) On the Law of Effect. Journal of
    Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13:342-366.
    Ho T, Camerer C, Weigelt K (1998) Iterated dominance and
    iterated best response in experimental ''p-beauty
    contests''. American Economic Review 88(4):947-969.
    Kahneman D (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus
    and Giroux, New York.
    Keynes J M (1936) The General Theory of Employment,
    Interest, and Money. London: Macmillan.
    Kocher M, Sutter M (2006) Time is money - Time pressure,
    incentives, and the quality of decision-making. Journal
    of Economic Behavior and Organization 61(3):375-392.
    Kovac E, Ortmann A, Vojtek M (2007) Comparing guessing
    games with homogeneous and heterogeneous players:
    Experimental results and a CH Explanation. Economics
    Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences Working
    Paper.
    Kyllonen P C (1996) Is working memory capacity Spearman's
    g? In Dennis I, Tapsfield P (eds.), Human abilities:
    Their nature and measurement. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
    Kyllonen P C, Christal, R E (1990) Reasoning ability is
    (little more than) working-memory capacity?! Intelligence
    14:389-433.
    Lewandowsky, S., Oberauer, K., Yang, L.-X., and Ecker, U.
    (2010). A working memory test battery for MATLAB.
    Behavioral Research Methods 42(2):571-585.
    Luce D (1991) Response Times: Their Role in Inferring
    Elementary Mental Organization. Oxford University Press,
    1991.
    McCain R (2010) Learning Level-k Play in Noncooperative
    Games. Working Paper, Drexel University.
    http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/McCainR/top/eco/wps/Levelk.pdf
    Moulin H (1986) Game Theory for Social Sciences. New York:
    New York University Press.
    Nagel R (1995) Unraveling in guessing games: An
    experimental study. American Economic Review 85(5):1313-
    1326.
    Nagel R (1998) A survey on beauty contest experiments:
    Bounded rationality and learning. In: Budescu D, Erev I,
    Zwick R (eds.), Games and Human Behavior, Essays in Honor
    of Amnon Rapoport. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., New
    Jersey.
    Nagel R (2008). Experimental beauty contest games: Levels
    of reasoning and convergence to equilibrium. In: Plott C
    R, Smith V (eds.) Handbook of Experimental Economics
    Results, Vol. 1, Chapter 45, 391-410, Elsevier.
    Oberauer K, Süß H-M, Schulze R, Wilhelm O, Wittmann W (2000)
    Working memory capacity - Facets of a cognitive ability
    construct. Personality and Individual Differences 29
    (6):1017-1045.
    Ohtsubo Y, (2002) Strategy learning in two-person constant-
    sum game and theory of mind. Poster session presented at
    the 4th annual meeting of the Human Behavior and
    Evolution Society of Japan, Hokkaido University, Japan.
    Piovesan M, Wengstrom E (2009) Fast or fair? A study of
    response times. Economics Letters 105:193-196.
    Rubinstein A (2007) Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: A
    study of response times. The Economic Journal 117:1243-
    1259.
    Rydval O, Ortmann A, Ostatnicky M (2009) Three very simple
    games and what it takes to solve them. Journal of
    Economic Behavior and Organization 72(1):589-601.
    Schnusenberg, O. and Gallo, A. (2011). On cognitive ability
    and learning in a beauty contest. Journal for Economic
    Educators 11(1):13-24.
    Simon H A (1990) Invariants of human behavior. Annual
    Review of Psychology 41:1-19.
    Stahl D (1996) Boundedly rational rule learning in a
    guessing game. Games and Economic Behavior 16(2):303-330.
    Stahl D (1998) Is step-j thinking an arbitrary modeling
    restriction or a fact of human nature? Journal of
    Economic Behavior and Organization 37(1):33-51.
    Thaler R H (2000) From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens.
    Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(1):133-141.
    Thorndike E L (1911) Animal Intelligence. New York:
    Macmillan.
    Weber R (2003) 'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive
    guessing game. Games and Economic Behavior 44(1):134-144.

    QR CODE
    :::