以機率或頻率方式呈現訊息對風險知覺評估的影響，過去的研究有不一致的結果，原因可能來自於判斷事件與受試者的自我相關程度不同，而引發捷思或系統性的訊息處理歷程。實驗一發現當事件的自我相關程度高，受試者會採用系統性的認知處理，而事件的自我相關程度低時，受試者會採用捷思性的認知處理。實驗二詢問受試者認為以機率或頻率方式呈現訊息何者較清楚明確，結果發現有77.5％的受試者認為以頻率方式呈現訊息較以機率方式呈現訊息清楚明確。實驗三操弄「事件自我相關程度」與「機率或頻率方式呈現訊息」，結果發現當事件為高自我相關時，機率或頻率方式呈現訊息在風險知覺的判斷上沒有差異；而當事件為低自我相關時，則頻率方式呈現訊息的「風險知覺」與「事件聯想負向詞數量」均大於機率方式呈現訊息。另外，當事件為低自我相關時，訊息明確度與事件聯想負向詞數量對風險知覺有顯著的預測力。以上的結果支持不同事件自我相關程度會引發捷思或系統性訊息處理，而頻率方式呈現訊息較機率方式呈現訊息清楚明確的原因，與Slovic等人(2000)提出頻率較具體，容易想像的推論符合，但不支持Gigerenzer和Edwards (2003)認為機率的參照類別不清楚的假設。此外，自我相關程度與可得性捷思為影響頻率或機率方式呈現訊息對風險知覺判斷結果不一致的重要變項。

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