本文將嚐試利用一小國Harris-Todaro模型，探討所得與資本移轉所產生的就業效果，是否會導致移轉矛盾發生。
在第2章，為了方便和後續各章結論比較，我們先由一個兩財兩要素且充分就業的經濟體系，探討所得與資本移轉在關稅、配額與自動出口限制三種貿易障礙下對受贈小國所產生之長短期福利效果。所得移轉在三種貿易障礙下均只會產生直接效果而無間接效果。但資本移轉則有可能產生間接效果，例如在關稅下會產生Johnson效果，在自動出口限制下會因可貿易財價格的變動而產生進口支出效果，但在配額下間接效果不會影響受贈國的福利。
在第3章，我們將Harris-Todaro失業特徵放入模型中，在本章我們假設受贈國對進口財課徵關稅。在關稅下，所得與長期資本移轉的經濟效果與充分就業的情況一致，並無額外的間接效果。但在短期資本移轉下，則會多出就業效果。
在第4章我們假設受贈國採取配額政策，或貿易伙伴國對其採取自動出口限制。在本章，無論所得與資本移轉均比充分就業的情況多就業此一間接效果。
第5章則比第3章多一個非貿易財部門，其餘條件均與第3章同。我們想利用本章探討貿易財價格不變而非貿易財價格可變的情況下，跨國援助的經濟效果有何不同。在本章，跨國援助會因資本在部門間移動的差異，而有不同的間接效果。但總而言之，在本章下，可能發生的間接效果為Johnson、就業與非貿易部門效果此三種。
第6章則為本文的總結。

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