民國90年代初期，我國參照美、日私募之規定，正式引進私募制度。此後，企業得以選擇公開現金增資，或透過私募發行新股，來募集所需的營運資金。根據統計，民國94年以後，台灣的私募市場日趨成熟，私募逐漸成為企業最重要的籌資管道之一，特別是讓原先不能符合公開募集資格之公司，合法迅速取得資金。雖然私募之平均發行金額仍小於公開現金增資，但近年來私募件數平均都有超越公開現金增資之表現，顯示私募在資本募集市場的重要角色，也肯定其對於企業和經濟發展之正面功效。
過去文獻指出，美國之私募平均以折價發行，且有顯著正的宣告股價效果。針對不同樣本之特性，Wruck（1989）、Hertzel and Smith（1993）和Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan（2007）分別提出監督假說（monitoring hypothesis）、資訊不對稱假說（information asymmetry hypothesis）和自利假說（entrenchment hypothesis）解釋之。雖然我國之私募制度多參照美國而訂定，但法律架構和私募流程仍有相當程度的差異。因此，本研究將以上述三大假說為基礎，藉由樣本敘述統計和線性迴歸分析，探討我國上市上櫃公司私募之定價與宣告股價效果。
我們自公開資訊觀測站收集民國91年至98年7月底之私募股權樣本，扣除變數資料不全者，最後共有398筆，包含上市公司174筆，上櫃公司224筆。研究發現，我國私募多以折價發行。其中，特別股之折價幅度低於普通股，電子科技類普通股之折價幅度又高於普通股之平均。而且，根據迴歸結果，私募金額、私募比率和公司規模三個變數最能解釋我國私募之折溢價幅度，但並沒有傾向支持任一個私募假說。
至於宣告股價效果，我國私募董事會和股東會皆不顯著為正，且宣告股價效果的迴歸解釋力也偏低，只有股價淨值較具顯著性。探究其原因，可能是因為我國私募制度不同所致。依證交法之規定，私募股權需先經由董事會和股東會同意後，始得募集。然而，最後私募成功與否常與市況和發行公司能否找到適當投資人等密切相關。既然兩事件日都不能保證私募可以如期完成，我們也就無法預期投資人會對私募有明確迅速的反應。

In the beginning of 2000, Taiwan’s Securities Transaction Law was amended to introduce the new way of financing- private placements. Since then public corporations are allowed to issue new securities either by public offerings and private placements. According to statistics, after 2005 private placements have become one of the most important funding sources for corporations, especially for those who are disqualified for public offerings. Although the average proceed of private placements is still relatively small, the number of private placements has already surpassed that of public offerings in recent years. This manifests the important role of private placements in building a sound financial market.
Private placements in the U.S., despite selling at discounts, are associated with significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement date. With different sample characteristics, Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) suggest monitoring hypothesis, information asymmetry hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis respectively. Our study is based with these three most accepted hypotheses and aims to give an insight in Taiwan’s private placement of equities for public corporations.
I search the Market Observation Post System for all private placements from 2002 to July of 2009, and obtain a sample of 398 private equities with complete data. Empirical evidence shows that Taiwan’s private equities are selling at discounts as well and “proceeds of private equity”, “placement fraction” and “corporate size” are the three significant explanatory variables for discounts. However, all the results seem not to fully support any hypothesis as mentioned above.
On the other hand, the announcement stock price effects on the board and shareholders’ meeting are insignificantly positive in Taiwan. The regressions on the announcement stock price returns also indicate low explanatory power with only “Tobin’s Q” variable being significant overall. This may be attributed to the legislation differences between U.S. and Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Securities Transaction Law, private equities should be first approved by the board and shareholders’ meeting, but might not be a successful private equity placement due to market condition, lack of proper investors and others. As a result, we can’t expect investors would instantly, correctly respond to this resolution information on those announcement dates.

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