後疫情時代，全球性晶片短缺、美中科技戰升溫，以及各國對關鍵物資高度依賴單一供應來源之安全焦慮，共同促使全球半導體供應鏈由「效率導向」轉向「安全導向」之結構性重組。在此典範轉移中，半導體已被各國重新定位為攸關國家安全與科技霸權之戰略性物資：美國透過《晶片與科學法案》、出口管制與友岸外包推動供應鏈重組，歐盟、日本、韓國與新加坡相繼提出韌性策略，中國大陸則以「科技自立自強」因應封鎖。
對位居全球先進製程核心之臺灣而言，此一變遷既是機會亦是風險。一方面，人工智慧與高效能運算需求推升我國晶圓代工之戰略價值，鞏固「矽盾」(Silicon Shield)論述；另一方面，臺積電赴美、日、德設廠，亦使技術外移、產業聚落弱化與「去臺化」之疑慮升高。
本研究採國際政治經濟學之「國家中心途徑」，結合現實主義、地緣經濟、武器化相互依存與科技民族主義理論，以文獻分析、比較研究、個案研究與歷史制度分析為方法，探討全球半導體供應鏈重組之政治邏輯及其對我國之影響。研究發現，當前以「供應鏈韌性」為名之政策實作，反映大國科技權力競逐下之地緣政治秩序重建；美國供應鏈韌性之提升，並不必然等同於臺灣供應鏈韌性之提升，二者間甚至存在結構性矛盾。透過對照一九八〇年代日本半導體衰退之歷史經驗，本研究主張，我國政策核心目標應由被動配合全球重組，轉為主動建構「以臺灣為核心、兼顧全球布局與戰略自主性」之新供應鏈模式。

In the post-pandemic era, the global chip shortage, the intensifying U.S.-China technology competition, and widespread anxiety over dependence on a single source of supply for strategic goods have jointly driven a structural reorganization of the global semiconductor supply chain, shifting it from an efficiency-oriented to a security-oriented logic. Within this paradigm shift, semiconductors have been redefined as strategic materials bearing on national security and technological hegemony: the United States has restructured supply chains through the CHIPS and Science Act, export controls, and friend-shoring; the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have each advanced their own resilience strategies; and the People’s Republic of China has responded to containment with a policy of technological self-reliance.
For Taiwan, which occupies the core of advanced-node production, this transformation is at once an opportunity and a risk. On the one hand, demand generated by artificial intelligence and high-performance computing has raised the strategic value of Taiwan’s foundry sector and reinforced the “Silicon Shield” thesis. On the other hand, TSMC’s investments in the United States, Japan, and Germany have heightened concerns over technology outflow, erosion of the domestic industrial cluster, and the prospect of “de-Taiwanization.”
Adopting the state-centric approach of international political economy and drawing on realism, geo-economics, weaponized interdependence, and techno-nationalism, this thesis employs documentary analysis, the comparative method, case studies, and historical-institutional analysis to examine the political logic of this reorganization and its implications for Taiwan. It finds that policies pursued in the name of “supply chain resilience” reflect a reconstruction of the geopolitical order under great-power technological competition, and that gains in U.S. supply chain resilience do not necessarily translate into gains for Taiwan; the two may even stand in structural tension. Drawing on the comparative lesson of Japan’s semiconductor decline after the 1980s, the thesis argues that Taiwan’s policy objective should shift from passive accommodation of global restructuring toward the active construction of a Taiwan-centered supply chain model that balances global deployment with strategic autonomy.

一、中文部分
（一）專書
李世暉，《鏈實力：島鏈、供應鏈、民主鏈，新半導體地緣政治學》（新北：明白文化事業有限公司，2024年）。
格雷厄姆·艾利森(Graham Allison)著，包淳亮譯，《注定一戰？中美能否避免修昔底德陷阱》（新北：八旗文化，2018年）。
馬修·克蘭恩(Matthew C. Klein)、麥可·佩提斯(Michael Pettis)著，陳儀譯，《貿易戰就是階級戰：日益惡化的階級不平等，如何導致全球經濟失衡、引發國際衝突》（臺北：麥田出版，2022年）。
黃欽勇，《科技島鏈：中美日韓台共構的產業新局》（臺北：大椽股份有限公司，2019年）。
葉至誠、葉立誠合著，《研究方法與論文寫作》（臺北：商鼎文化，2002年）。
（二）期刊論文
方俊德，2021/01。〈美中科技冷戰對於台灣產業在全球供應鏈之影響〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第44卷第1期，頁28-34。
毛驤文，2023/10。〈主要國家因應美中晶片戰爭之半導體產業發展策略〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第46卷第10期，頁83-91。
王健全，2025/09。〈混沌世局中臺灣經濟的展望與策略〉，《清流雙月刊》，第59期，頁23-30。
王聖閔，2024/12。〈美中科技戰與強化供應鏈韌性〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第47卷第12期，頁20-25。
曲永義、李先軍，2022。〈創新鏈趕超：中國集成電路產業的創新與發展〉，《經濟管理》，2022年第9期，頁5-26。
何志峰，2020/10。〈美「中」科技戰之情境分析與臺灣產業因應策略研究〉，《展望與探索月刊》，第18卷第10期，頁37-63。
吳澤林、尚修丞，2022。〈美國重塑半導體產業鏈的邏輯〉，《和平與發展》，2022年第6期，頁71-93。
汪婉，2023。〈美國對華發動「芯片戰」與日本政企背離傾向〉，《日本研究》，2023年第1期，頁60-71。
李佳蓁，2025/09。〈全球半導體產業與主要國家半導體政策推動在地製造趨勢〉，《機械工業雜誌》，第510期，頁13-19。
李沃牆，2023/12。〈東南亞半導體供應鏈的發展與挑戰〉，《會計研究月刊》，第457期，頁16-21。
周祝瑛，2008/03。〈《比較教育研究：方法與途徑》之評介〉，《當代教育研究季刊》，第16卷第1期，頁155-165。
林士清，2022/11。〈布局北美市場半導體產業之國安考量〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第45卷第11期，頁68-75。
林佩蓉，2025/01。〈科技民族主義：引領美國半導體產業政經趨勢的看不見的手〉，《科際整合月刊》，第10卷第1期，頁28-45。
林詩凱、徐美雯，2023/10。〈半導體出口管制政策對美—中科技戰影響之研析〉，《戰略安全研析》，第182期，頁12-29。
林嘉華，2021/12。〈美中新冷戰對中國高科技產業發展的影響—以半導體產業為例〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第44卷第12期，頁74-79。
柯惠敏，2025/03。〈劍指中國：從川普1.0到拜登的半導體出口管制政策〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第48卷第3期，頁67-74。
張宏遠，2007/07。〈「發展型國家」理論的回顧及其在中國研究適用性之探討〉，《東亞研究》，第38卷第2期，頁86-121。
陳尚武等，2024。〈台積電宣佈德國設廠對台灣科技大廠股價之影響〉，《管理資訊計算》，第13卷第2期，頁174-183。
陳信宏，2021/07。〈美中科技衝突的影響：全球價值鏈觀點〉，《經濟前瞻》，第196期，頁35-40。
曾怡仁，2007。〈國際政治經濟學三大研究途徑—經濟民族主義、經濟自由主義與馬克思主義—之比較分析〉，《全球政治評論》，第19期，頁53-86。
馮昭奎，2018。〈日本半導體產業發展的趕超與創新——兼談對加快中國芯片技術發展的思考〉，《日本學刊》，2018年第6期，頁11-30。
葉長城，2021/10。〈近期美國對中科技政策的形成、轉變及其主要可能影響研析：以半導體產業為例〉，《全球政治評論》，第76期，頁55-84。
葉長城，2024/10。〈美中科技戰對台灣跨國半導體企業的地緣經濟影響與其因應策略分析〉，《全球政治評論》，第88期，頁63-92。
鄭喬仁，2022/12。〈美、歐推動「晶片法案」對全球半導體產業之政策意涵〉，《臺灣經濟研究月刊》，第45卷第12期，頁6-7。
羅琪玟、古明君、鄭志鵬，2025/06。〈【研究紀要】美中科技戰下的抉擇：初探竹科從業者對美中臺關係與高科技產業全球布局〉，《中國大陸研究》，第68卷第2期，頁73-131。
顧瑩華，2022/01。〈後疫情時代臺灣面對的機會與挑戰〉，《經濟前瞻》，第199期，頁109-113。
Alex Capri著，李柏彥譯，2021/05。〈美「中」科技民族主義〉，《國防譯粹》，第48卷第5期，頁84-89。
（三）官方文獻與研究報告
財團法人中技社，〈全球前瞻科技人才政策對臺灣之啟示〉（專題報告編號2024-13），收於《中技社113年度研究報告摘要彙編》（臺北：財團法人中技社，2025年2月）。
國家發展委員會產業發展處，〈穩固臺灣半導體國際領先地位〉，《台灣經濟論衡》，第22卷第3期（2024年秋季號），頁20-25。
経済産業省商務情報政策局，《半導體・數位產業戰略》（令和5年6月）。
経済産業省商務情報政策局，「第１回　次世代半導体等小委員会」資料３（東京：経済産業省，2024年12月）。
二、外文部分
（一）官方文獻
Allen, Gregory C. Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI: New U.S. Export Controls on AI and Semiconductors Mark a Transformation of U.S. Technology Competition with China. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022.
Benson, Emily, Japhet Quitzon, and William A. Reinsch. Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity: Squaring the Circle on Deeper Cooperation. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2023.
Bogusz, Michał. The Silicon Shield: Taiwan amid the Superpowers’ Rivalry. OSW Studies no. 83. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2023.
Boston Consulting Group. Japanese Semiconductor Renaissance: Accelerating the “New Direction” with Technology Leadership. Boston Consulting Group, October 2024.
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce. Public Report on the Use of Mature-Node Semiconductors. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, December 2024.
European Commission. A Chips Act for Europe. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2022) 45 final. Brussels: European Commission, 8 February 2022.
Grossman, Derek. The Chinese Communist Party’s Gray Zone Tactics Against Taiwan. Washington, DC: Global Taiwan Institute, 2025.
Innovate UK. Innovate UK Global Expert Mission Report: Semiconductors in Republic of Korea. Swindon: Innovate UK, February 2024.
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Japan’s Semiconductor and Digital Strategy. Tokyo: METI, IT Industry Division, February 2022.
OECD. OECD Supply Chain Resilience Review: Navigating Risks. Paris: OECD, 2025.
Project 2049 Institute and US-Taiwan Business Council. United States, Taiwan, and Semiconductors: A Critical Supply Chain Partnership. Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute and US-Taiwan Business Council, June 2023.
Reinsch, William A., and Jack Whitney. Silicon Island: Assessing Taiwan’s Importance to U.S. Economic Growth and Security. CSIS Briefs. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025.
Schwellnus, Cyrille, Antton Haramboure, and Lea Samek. Policies to Strengthen the Resilience of Global Value Chains: Empirical Evidence from the COVID-19 Shock. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers No. 141. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023.
Shivakumar, Sujai, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell. Balancing the Ledger: Export Controls on U.S. Chip Technology to China. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2024.
Thadani, Akhil, and Gregory C. Allen. Mapping the Semiconductor Supply Chain: The Critical Role of the Indo-Pacific Region. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023.
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. “Taiwan – Semiconductors Including Chip Design for AI.” Taiwan Country Commercial Guide, December 1, 2025.
Varas, Antonio, and Raj Varadarajan. Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association, 2021.
The White House. Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017. Washington, DC: The White House, 2021.
（二）專書及專書論文
Irwin, Douglas A. “The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict.” In The Political Economy of Trade Protection, edited by Anne O. Krueger, 5-14. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
Javorcik, Beata. “Global Supply Chains Will Not Be the Same in the Post-COVID-19 World.” In COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work, edited by Richard E. Baldwin and Simon J. Evenett, 111-116. London: CEPR Press, 2020.
Miroudot, Sébastien. “Resilience versus Robustness in Global Value Chains: Some Policy Implications.” In COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work, edited by Richard E. Baldwin and Simon J. Evenett, 117-130. London: CEPR Press, 2020.
（三）期刊論文
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42-79.
Flamm, Kenneth. “Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1993 (1993): 249-333.
Friedberg, Aaron L. “The Growing Rivalry Between America and China and the Future of Globalization.” Texas National Security Review 5, no. 1 (Winter 2021/2022): 95-119.
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 1 (2005): 78-104.
Lee, Seungjoo. “High Technology and Economic Statecraft: The Emergence of Techno-Economic Statecraft in South Korea.” Business and Politics 27, no. 3 (2025): 484-503.
Luo, Yadong, and Ari Van Assche. “Techno-Geopolitical Uncertainty and International Business: Implications of the United States Chips and Science Act.” Journal of International Business Studies (2022).
Negrine, Joseph, Christopher Findlay, and Shiro Armstrong. “Chips in Japan: Industrial Policy, Decline and Renewal.” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 25-E-116. Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, December 2025.
Wang, Chia-Nan, Nhat-Luong Nhieu, Chen-Te Chiang, and Yen-Hui Wang. “Assessing Southeast Asia Countries’ Potential in the Semiconductor Supply Chain: An Objectively Weighting Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Approach.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 11, no. 1 (2024): 1260.
（四）企業與產業報告
Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association (TSIA). Overview on Taiwan Semiconductor Industry (2025 Edition). Hsinchu: TSIA, 2025.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. TSMC 2024 Annual Report. Hsinchu: TSMC, 2025.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. 2024 Sustainability Report. Hsinchu: TSMC, 2025.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. “TSMC Arizona and U.S. Department of Commerce Announce up to US$6.6 Billion in Proposed CHIPS Act Direct Funding, the Company Plans Third Leading-Edge Fab in Phoenix.” Press Release, Phoenix, Arizona, April 8, 2024.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. “TSMC Intends to Expand Its Investment in the United States to US$165 Billion to Power the Future of AI.” Press Release, Hsinchu, March 4, 2025.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. “Second Quarter 2026 Earnings Conference.” Hsinchu: TSMC, July 16, 2026.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. “TSMC Fabs.” Corporate website. Accessed July 20, 2026. https://www.tsmc.com/english/aboutTSMC/TSMC_Fabs.
European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. “ESMC Breaks Ground on Dresden Fab.” Press Release, Dresden, August 20, 2024.
United Microelectronics Corporation. Annual Report (Form 20-F) for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2025. Filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026.