John Searle認為傳統心物問題有一個簡單解決方案，他稱此方案為「生物自然主義」(biological naturalism)。本文關懷Searle的生物自然主義是否能融貫地回答心物問題的兩個重要面向：心腦關係與心理因果。前者聚焦在存有學面向，給定我們對世界的理解—或許是物理主義(physicalism)—大腦如何作為心靈、意識等出現的解釋根源，它們的關係又是甚麼。後者則聚焦在因果面向，心靈、意識等是否參與世界的因果進程。

在當時的脈絡下，生物自然主義因主張意識具「不可化約性」(ontological irreducibility)故大多被理解為非化約論。同時，專注於心理因果問題的Jaegwon Kim卻以他版本的排除問題(exclusion problem)論證，主張「不可化約性」與心理因果有效存在張力。似乎Kim版本的排除問題正好能充當生物自然主義的試金石。

本文將先後交待Kim版本的排除問題及對生物自然主義的攻擊，並進一步剖析Kim版本的排除問題。我也將先停留在Kim的脈絡內試圖以內部方式作出回應。我視此為一種溫和的回應(mild response)。接着我將進入Searle提出生物自然主義的背景並呈現Searle如何從根本地提出一種消解「心理因果有效」與「心之不可化約性」間不融貫的框架。我視之為一種根本的回應(radical response)。

John Searle believes that there is a simple solution to mind-body problem, which he called biological naturalism. The feature of Searle’s theory is how he face mind-body problem by fulfilling the two most essential instincts in thinking of mind: ontologically irreducibility of mind and mental causal efficacious. In the context of modern philosophy of mind, especially considering physicalism, Searle’s theory are inconsistent because of the tension between these two. Exclusion problem is infamously proposing that, within physicalism, ontoligcally irreduciblity of mind and the mental causal efficacious are inconsistent. To me, this makes exclusion problem a tool to examine the validity of biological naturalism.
Kim’s notion of exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 1, also I will show how exclusion problem attacks biological naturalism. In Chapter 2, I will further explain what the fundamental idea is behind it. Besides, I will provide a response which remains in its framework- the ‘mild’ response. The radical one, which I think what biological naturalism is, abandons the whole framework behind exclusion problem will be revealed in Chapter 3 and 4.

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