自1949年中華民國政府自中國大陸戰略撤退以來，台灣與中華人民共和國之間的關係一直是印太地區乃至全球極為重要的議題。時至1996年，台灣民主化進程加劇了兩岸間的緊張局勢，美台關係亦隨之惡化。2008年，馬英九當選中華民國總統，國民黨重新執政，兩岸關係隨之出現重大變化，緊張情勢得以緩解，雙方開始就多項議題進行溝通與協商，並由此和平維繫現狀。本文旨在探討馬英九政府（2008–2016年）如何成功維持兩岸和平穩定的現狀。
本研究採用Kuik Cheng-Chwee與Gilbert Rozman所提出之「權力－回應光譜」（Power-Response Spectrum）作為分析架構，透過網路與圖書館取得之次級資料與文獻進行質性研究。同時，作者亦訪談一位與馬英九合作逾15年的關鍵人士，藉此補充研究之深度。
研究結果顯示，「避險策略」（hedging strategy）與維繫兩岸和平現狀之間具有高度關聯。雙方在「九二共識」的基礎上進行互動、溝通、協商與建立互信，是達成和平現狀的關鍵因素。因此，作者認為馬英九政府藉由採取避險策略，成功維持了兩岸關係的和平現狀。

The Republic of China’s relations with the People’s Republic of China have always been a very important issue for not only the Indo-Pacific region, but also the world since the KMT’s strategic retreat from the mainland in 1949. Fast forward to 1996, the democratization of Taiwan resulted in more severe cross-strait tension, the U.S.-Taiwan relations also deteriorated. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election and brought the KMT back to the office, the situation quickly changed again, the cross-strait tension settled, the two sides started to communicate and negotiate a series of issues, the status quo was thus maintained peacefully. This thesis intends to find out how did the Ma administration (2008-2016) successfully maintained the status quo between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait peacefully.
The author adopted the “Power-Response Spectrum” created by Kuik Cheng-Chwee & Gilbert Rozman to compose qualitative research on secondary data and literature accessed via internet and library. Together with the qualitative research, the author also conducts an in-depth interview with an important figure who has been working closely with Ma for more than 15 years.
The analysis showed a strong correlation between adopting hedging strategy and maintaining a peaceful status quo between Taipei and Beijing. The key to achieve this is the interaction, communication, negotiation and mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing based on the acknowledgment of the “1992 Consensus.” Thus, the author concludes that Ma administration’s adoption of hedging strategy successfully maintained a peaceful status quo.

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