本研究針對民國91到95之間，台灣發行員工認股權憑證之上市上櫃公司進行調查，利用羅吉特迴歸模型進行分析，希望能夠透過員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理變數之間的關聯性研究，找出能夠反映員工認股權憑證設計是否偏向管理當局的公司治理變數，並且提供政府與投資人未來在政策制訂與決策上的一些參考依據。
本研究使用「外部股東持股>5%總和」、「政府持有」、「盈餘股份偏離比」、「董事會規模」、「外部董監事」作為公司治理變數；分析結果發現在「盈餘股份偏離比」的部分，於樣本觀察期間，都呈現正向關係，並且於93、94年達到顯著。盈餘股份偏離比越大的時候，一般象徵著盈餘權的不對等，同時也隱含公司治理風險，因此由上述結果本研究推論，當盈餘股份偏離比擴大時員工認股選擇權的設計方式將更朝向管理當局的偏好靠近。支持管理權力假說的看法；當進一步利用同樣的方法針對含公司特性控制變數的迴歸結果進行跨期的一致性分析時，發現盈餘股份偏離比以及董事會規模的顯著性雙雙提高，盈餘股份偏離比依舊為正相關董事會規模也呈現正相關。

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