本文是以Candel-Sánchez and Campoy-Miñarro (2004)的績效契約制訂為基礎
，開放單獨由政府制訂契約的假設，賦予央行與政府部門雙方皆具有談判力，並利用Nash談判解(Nash bargaining solution)做出最適績效契約。此外，我們也討論政府央行的談判力、對薪資的偏好和央行官員保守度在不同工資調整指數下與最適績效契約之間的關係，並分析能影響產出及通貨膨脹穩定性的因素。
經本文的研究分析，我們可以發現:政府的談判力愈大績效誘因基數愈大，此時能有效抑制通膨產生，但是同時也會使產出下降。當工資調整指數趨於零時，政府的談判力將不會對產出造成影響只會降低通貨膨脹率。
央行官員若是愈保守愈重視通貨膨脹帶來的效用損失，會使績效誘因基數下降。其中，本文的分析與Rogoff (1985)的有相同的結果，增加央行官員的保守性雖有利抑制通膨且增加通膨穩定性，另一方面卻打擊產出水準同時會使產出易受外來衝擊的影響。當工資調整指數愈低時，央行官員的保守性也會對績效誘因基數的變動愈大。
央行官員愈關心薪資收入多寡，績效誘因基數就愈低，但是對通貨膨脹與產出的影響則須視談判央行對薪資的偏好程度與最適誘因基數大小而定。政府愈在意營運成本，談判出的最適績效誘因基數會愈低，而且會同時造成通貨膨脹率與產出的上升。
在討論經濟穩定性時，我們發現僅有央行官員保守程度、工資調整指數與隨機干擾衝擊的變異數會對產出及通貨膨脹率的穩定性造成影響;但納入談判協商得到的績效誘因基數，並不會造成經濟體系的波動。我們也發現本文與Rogoff (1985)的結論相同之處在於央行官員極度保守時會完全消除通貨膨脹率，但是會使產出完全反映隨機干擾項的衝擊。

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