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| 研究生： |
張馨云 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
垂直結合廠商防止連續結合的先占策略 Preempting Successive Mergers by a Vertically Merged Firm |
| 指導教授： | 溫偉任 |
| 口試委員: |
陳為政
李文傑 溫偉任 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系 Department of International Business |
| 論文出版年： | 2018 |
| 畢業學年度： | 106 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 24 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | Preempting successive mergers, Vertically merged firm |
| DOI URL： | http://doi.org/10.6814/THE.NCCU.IB.036.2018.F06 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：74 下載：28 |
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We investigate strategies that an incumbent vertically merged firm will implement to achieve maximal profit. When a horizontal merger occurs, it will decrease the profit of a vertically merged firm. Thus, the vertically merged firm will preempt the horizontal merger by merging with one of the downstream firms. However, this leaves open possibility for remaining firms to merge vertically. We then further analyze how a vertically merged firm preempts subsequent vertical mergers. We find that, among various preempting strategies, it is most profitable for the firm to merge with all of the downstream firms.
1 Introduction 3
2 The Model 5
3 The Successive Model 6
3.1 A Vertically Merged Firm, a Non-Merged Upstream Firm and Two Non-Merged Downstream Firms 7
3.2 A Vertically Merged Firm, a Horizontally Merged Firm and a Non-Merged Upstream Firm 9
3.3 A Vertically Merged Firm Preempts the Horizontal Merger by Merging with the Downstream Firm 14
3.4 A Vertically Merged Firm Preempts the Vertical Merger by Merging with the Downstream Firm 19
4 Conclusion 22
References 24
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[8] Narioka, K., 2018. “China Approves Toshiba’s 18 Billion Dollars Sale of Its Memory-Chip Unit,” The Wall Street Journal, (May 17), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-approves-toshibas-18-billion-sale-of-memorychip-unit-1526552434
[9] Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G. and Salop, S. C., 1990, “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,” The American Economic Review, 80(1), p.127-142.
[10] Yao, Z. and Zhou, W., 2015, “Vertical or Horizontal: Endogenous Merger Waves in Vertically Related Industries,” The B.E. Journal of Economics Analysis and Policy, 15(3), p.1237-1262.
